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envy and outsider trading; the case of
martha stewart
Jeanne L. Schroeder*

I.

CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY

On March 5, 2004, Martha Stewart was convicted of four counts of
obstruction of justice, lying to federal investigators, and conspiracy in
connection with statements she made about her December 2001 sale ot
approximately 4,000 shares of ImClone Systems, Inc. stock. The tnal
and its aftermath generated a media storm second only to that of O.L
Simpson. Although many if not most news accounts dutifully repeated
the fact that Stewart was not even charged, let alone convicted, of
insider trading, they frequently referred to the event as the "Martha
Stewart insider trading case" in tones implying that she was morally, if
not legally, guilty of that offense as well.i
In fact, it is far from clear whether Stewart's trades were unlawful,
let alone illegal, and it is hard to identify any harm her acts directly
caused anyone.^ Indeed, the only clear harm to date has been to Stewart
personally and the shareholders of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia
which stock price has been buffeted by what might be false accusations
against its eponymous founder. In early March 2003, Martha Stewart

* Professor of Law, the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New York
City. I would like to thank those who commented on earlier versions of this paper delivered at
the 2003 Law & Culture Annual Meeting and faculty seminars at the Boston Univers^ Law
School, Brooklyn Law School, University of Miami Law School, and the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law I would also like to thank Mara Davis for her research and editing assistance.
1 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has brought a civil insider trading case
against Stewart. Although she has not done so at the time this Article went to press, it is widely
speculated that she will settle these charges rather than risk another tnal. See Deborah Solomon
driminal Convictions of Stewart. Baconovic Aid SEC's Civil Case, WALL ST. J. Mar. 8, 2004, a
CI; Charles Gasparino, Martha in Charge?, NEWSWEEK ONLINE, Feb. 25, 2005, available at
httD://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/70I8932/site/newsweek.
....
i
2 One ground of Stewart's appeal from conviction is that because the judge improperly
barred her counsel "from arguing that the ImClone trade was perfectly legal," &e jurors may have
been confused and "were left to make inferences about the propnety of the trade. M^hew Rose
& Kara Seannell, Lawyers for Stewart, Bacanovic Vow to Appeal, Defense Team Considers a
Variety of Arguments for Another Court Battle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2004, at C4;
also
Constance L. Hays, Appeal of Stewart Verdict Says Trial Was Full of Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 2004, at C3.
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Living Omnimedia announced its first ever quarterly losses, which it
attributed largely to adverse publicity.^ As a result, the price of her own
stock dropped so much that before her trial she reportedly suffered
paper losses of approximately $200 million,'* and other losses
aggregating about $400 million,^ an amount that dwarfs any losses she
allegedly tried to save by trading ImClone. The price of Martha Stewart
Omnimedia's stock dropped an additional 23 percent immediately upon
the announcement of Stewart's conviction.®
To state what should be obvious, Stewart is not an insider of
ImClone and is, therefore, incapable of engaging in classic insider
trading. Nor could she have breached any duty of confidence and
engaged in the "outsider" trading under the more controversial
"misappropriation theory." Moreover, to date, no facts have been made
public that would support a claim that Stewart was a tippee of a classic
insider. A prosecution of Stewart on insider trading charges would
require a court to adopt a new interpretation of the law of both
misappropriation and tipping far beyond existing precedents.'^
Consequently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) was reduced, in effect,
to arguing that it was illegal for her to lie about something that was not

3 See Matthew Rose, Martha Stewart Firm Has Loss as ImClone Inquiries Take Toll, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 5, 2003, at CLL; see also Imelone 10-K available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/

edgar/data/765258/000104746904007817/a213091Oz10-k.htm.
4 See W. Michael Cox, Markets Are Quick To Judge When Firms Fail To Behave,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Nov. 21, 2002, at A17. Plaintiff lawyers filed breach of fiduciary duty
law suits against Stewart on the theory that she should have known that her "illegal" activities
would adversely affect the price of Martha Stewart Omnimedia stock and "insider trading"
actions against other insiders of Martha Stewart Omnimedia on the grounds that, when they sold
their stock, they must have known that insider trading allegations would eventually be raised
against Stewart thereby depressing the price of the company's stock. See infra note 8.
5 See Jeffrey Toobin, Lunch at Martha's; Problems with the Perfect Life, NEW YORKER,
Feb. 3, 2003, at 38.
® See Gregory Zuckerman, Martha: The Doyenne of Dilemmas: Fear is Media Buyers,
Consumers Will Shy Away From Company, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2004, at CI. Stewart's fortunes
have been recovering. In what looks like a brilliant public relations move, she chose to serve her
five month prison term pending her appeal. She is now scheduled to star in two new television
series. See Martha Stewart to Star in New Apprentice, J. NEWS, Feb. 3, 2005, at 9A. The stock
price of Martha Stewart Omnimedia rebounded to a high of approximately $32 immediately prior
to her release from prison in early March 2005 from a low of almost $8 following her sentencing.
See Gregory Zuckerman & James Handler, Martha Stewart Living: No Bars, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3,
2001, at CI.
7 The DOJ's indictment did lay out alleged facts presumably designed to support an
allegation that Peter Baeanovic, Stewart's fnend, broker, and co-defendant, misappropriated the
fact that Sam Waksel was trying to sell his ImClone stock from Baeanovic's employer, Merrill
Lynch, in violation of a duty of confidentiality imposed by his employment agreement and that
Stewart was Baeanovic's tippee. The indictment did not, however, expressly set forth these legal
conclusions. This theory forms the heart of the SEC's civil action against Stewart. Stewart's
lawyers unsuccessfully moved to have this section stricken from the indictment on the grounds
that it is inflammatory and irrelevant given the fact that she has not been charged with insider
trading. See Colleen Debaise, Stewart Seeks Dismissal of Charges, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2003, at
CI2.
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illegal and that her protestations of innocence constituted the fraud upon
which she should be considered guilty!« That is, rather than being
accused of engaging in criminal insider trading, she has been accused of
obstruction of justice and lying to the government in connection with its
investigation of her trades. The SEC is seeking restitution from Stewart
of the approximately $40,000 in avoided losses on the grounds that she
was a tippee of her broker who "stole" the fact that insiders were selling
their stock—a novel theory that goes far beyond any other application
of the misappropriation theory to date.
In other words, to securities lawyers, the public reaction to the
Stewart affair appears wholly out of proportion, particularly when
compared to the obvious corporate improprieties of 2001. What
percentage of the American public can even identify such figures as
Jeffrey Skilling, Andrew Fastow,^ Dennis Kozlowski,io John Rigas,ii or
Scott Sullivan'2—to name but a few potential inductees to the Corporate
8 The charge that Stewart's statements concerning her ImClone stock constituted fraud upon
the shareholders of Martha Stewart Omnimedia was eventually thrown out by the trial judge.
Timothy E. Hoeffher & Risa B. Greene, Prosecutors too Bold, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 12, 2004, at 43.
However, similar accusations form the basis of a shareholders' suit against Martha Stewart
Omnimedia. 5ee swpra note 4.
9 Skilling and Fastow are the former Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer,
respectively, of Enron. Fastow pled guilty to multiple charges of securities fraud. Perhaps more
well known by the public is the former Chairman of Enron, Kenneth Lay, because of the
nickname "Kermy Boy" given him by President George W. Bush. Lay and Skilling are to be
prosecuted for securities fraud in 2006. See 3 Former Enron Executives Will Share a Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20,2004, at C3.
10 Kozlowski may have entered into the general public's collective consciousness because
videos of the notorious toga party he threw for his wife on the island of Sardinia were played at
his first trial, and were repeatedly aired on television news. Kozlowski was the former CEO of
Tyco who is currently being retried in New York State for looting the company by causing the
company to make and then forgive hundreds of millions of dollars of unapproved loans. Once
again, press reaction reflected more envy than jealousy. Story after story concentrated on
Kozlowski's ostentatious life style, which included the purchase of a $6,000 shower screen and a
$15,000 umbrella stand. From the perspective of both securities and corporate law, such
extravagance per se is irrelevant. What is relevant is that he allegedly used corporate funds for
this purpose without obtaining board approval or disclosing this remuneration to the public.
Kozlowski is the subject of a New Yorker magazine article by James Stewart which states that
Kozlowski, "more than any other executive who had prospered in the great bull market of the
nineties, came to personify an epoch of corporate fraud, executive greed, and personal
extravagance." James B. Stewart, Spendl Spendl Spend', NEW YORKER, Feb. 17 & 24, 2003, at
132. New York's first attempt to convict Kozlowski ended in a mistrial. Based on their negative
experience in the first trial, the prosecutors are now avoiding appeals to envy and directing the
jury's attention to the elements of the alleged crimes. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Prosecutors
Rewrite Script in New Trial of 2 at Tyco, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at CI.
11 Rigas is the founder and former CEO of Adelphia who was convicted, along with one of
his sons, of treating this public company as their personal bank account by embezzling hundreds
of millions of dollars. See Barry Meier, Corporate Conduct: The Overview; 2 Guilty in Fraud at
a Cable Giant, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at Al. The trial of a second son ended in mistrial. See
Barry Meier, Michael Rigas Is Free for Now After Mistrial Is Declared, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
2004, at CI.
,
12 Sullivan is the former WorldCom Chief Financial Officer who oversaw $11 billion in
fraudulent accounting. The eventual discovery of this fraud led to the filing of the largest
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Hall of Shame? I would bet that few would even recognize the name of
Sam Waksal, Stewart's friend and former chief of ImClone who is now
doing jail time for his clear and admitted violation of the insider trading
rules

I suggest that the public reaction to the Stewart "scandal" may not
be so much righteous outrage, but the ignominious sin of envy—the
pain one feels in seeing another experience joy. Envy is the mirror
image of schadenfreude^^—the joy one feels in seeing ano er
experience pain. In this essay I will use the Stewart episode as a
iumping-off point for analyzing the two competing legal theories of
unlawful securities trading on the basis of material non-public
information; the so-called "classic" theory, and the contooversial
"misappropriation" theory—more accurately termed
outsider
trading"—adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court m the case of United
States V O'Hagan}^ Although the misappropriation theory is widely
criticized, I believe that no one, to date, has convincingly explained
precisely why it seems so intuitively "wrong."
. • j
I posit that the distinction between the ethics of classic insider
trading and misappropriation precisely reflects the distinction between
the two often confused—but distinct—passions of jealousy and envy.
Although the terms are often incorrectly used interchangeably, jealousy
is the fear and anger one feels when contemplating the possibility tha a
rival either may take, or has taken, that which one believes rightfii y
belongs to one. Envy, in contrast, is the anger and pain one feels in
observing the good fortune of another.
.
Similarly, classic insider trading reflects the fear of investors m a
public company that rivals—specifically the company's management
and other fiduciaries—might take what rightfully belongs to investors
non-public information concerning and obtained from that company.
To be more precise, I posit that a prohibition on classic insider trading
law should be seen as a rough corollary to the mandatory disclosure
regime of the federal securities laws that can be seen as a Congressional
decision that certain information about publie companies belongs o
the investment public generally.
x
The misappropriation theory concerns the trading m securities
based on information received from a source other than the issuer of the
securities. It is based neither on the principles of federal secunties law
nor state corporate law, but derives from state trade secret law policy.

bankruptcy in U.S. history. Sullivan pled guilty to charges
was a star witness in the successful federal prosecution of former CFO Bernard Ebters.
13 "Schadenfreude (joy at another's suffering), [is] the inverse of en^ £ 433^^6 ie
success)... ." Jerome Neu, Jealous Thoughts, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS 425, 433 (Amelie
Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980) [hereinafter EXPLAINING EMOTIONS].
14 521 U.S. 642(1997).
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This policy is, unfortunately, totally antithetical to securities law policy
in that it reflects a state decision that the public, generally, has no right
to certain information so long as it is kept secret. That is, federal
securities law is about eliminating or reducing informational advantages
with respect to one class of information, while state trade secret law is
about protecting informational advantages with respect to another class
of information.
The misappropriation theory, consequently, involves the
resentment by the investment public that other persons have the good
fortune to enjoy something to which the public has no right—^non
public information obtained from third party sourees who are the legally
recognized owners of the information.
The ethical status of jealousy and envy are completely diverse. In
jealousy one wants to protect what one has or believes one should have.
In envy, one wants to destroy the possession of another. Jealousy is the
assertion of one's own claim of possession. Envy is the wish to destroy
the enjoyment of another whether or not it is rightful. Jealousy may not
be an attractive emotion, but even God admits that He is jealous. Envy,
however, is one of the seven deadly sins. Indeed, it is second only to
pride in its potentially corruptive effect on the soul. As etymology
reveals, envy—invidia—is the most invidious sin.
We need to remember, however, that sometimes even paranoiacs
have real enemies. Perhaps it is also true that what first appears to be
envy might, upon eloser look, seem more like jealousy. That is, it might
be the case that certain informational advantages that the law currently
allocates to specific individuals should, for one policy reason or
another, be allocated to the public. As Jerome Neu accurately says in
his analysis of envy:
That envy may be one reason for demanding equality does not mean
that demands for equality are unjustified.... [Tjhere are other
reasons, most importantly reasons of justice, for demanding (certain
forms of) equality. But from another perspective the real issue is
whether envy must form an inevitable obstacle to attempts to achieve
justice and/or equality.^^
In this Article, I propose an internally consistent analysis of insider
trading law based on any given allocation of property rights in non
public information. I am not, however, offering an apologia for the
status quo. I believe the current case law is, and is doomed to remain,
hopelessly inadequate because the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
federal securities laws requires the government to force the square peg
of insider trading into the round hole of actual fraud. This inevitably
causes ambiguities that create the opportunity for prosecutorial abuse—

15 Jerome Neu, Jealous Thoughts, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note 13, at 435.
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as Vaffaire Stewart illustrates. I believe that Congress should address
the appropriate allocation of informational advantages based on the
competing policies imderlying the federal securities laws and trade
secret law, among other ethical, legal, economic, and political
considerations.
This Article proceeds as follows. First, I analyze the distinction
between envy and jealousy from theological, psychoanalj^ical and
philosophic perspectives. I will then explain the two rival theories of
unlawful trading on the basis of material non-public information.
Finally, I apply this analysis to insider trading law to explain that the
misappropriation theory is incoherent and internally inconsistent
because it attempts to piggy-back insider trading law on trade secret
principles. The principles underlying these two different fields of law
are logically antithetical.
The prohibition against insider trading implicitly reflects a
Congressional determination that investors in a public company have a
beneficial interest in material non-public information about, and in the
possession of, that eompany. It reflects a rare egalitarian moment
within our generally individualistic, libertarian property regime. The
public is, therefore, rightfully jealous if a traditional insider of a public
company having privileged access to this type of information were to
exploit it for her own advantage without sharing it with the public. In
contrast, trade secret law is premised on the determination that the right
to control and commercially exploit certain other categories of
information resides exclusively in specific individuals and that the
public generally has no such rights—it is fundamentally individualistie
and monopolistic. For the government to assert that the investment
public is defrauded when this information is used to trade in securities
reflects envy.

II.

A.

ENVY

AND JEALOUSY

Martha, Martha, Martha!

After I admired the silver chopsticks that had been set out, Stewart
said, "You know, in China they say, 'The thinner the chopsticks, the
higher the social status.' Of course, I got the thinnest I could find."
After a pause, she added, "That's why people hate me."'^
The causes of the fracas about Martha Stewart are no doubt overdetermined, involving among other things the misogyny of the public
towards powerful women generally, Stewart's carefully developed, but
Toobin, supra note 5, at 39.

ENVY AND OUTSIDER TRADING
aimoyingly smug perfectionist public image specifically, as well as
widespread public misunderstanding that all trading based on non
public information or secret tips is generally unlawful.^'' I ar^e that it
also illustrates that envy is a strong component of "outsider" trading
law. Stewart's image inspires admiration, as well as ridicule and
backbiting. As stated in an article on CNN.com concerning the effect of
the insider trading allegations on Stewart s public image.
The public has long had a love-hate relationship with Stewart. She is
widely admired for her design and business acumen even as she's
disparaged for her perfectionist impulses and sheer omnipresence.
Indeed, the infuriating thing about Stewart is that, although she presents
each of her suggested projects as eminently doable, it would be
inconceivable to accomplish all of the projects suggested in even any
one-hour show. That is, she inspires guilt because she presents her
world as being both possible and impossible for anyone except her. As
stated in a Washington Post article, Stewart's ostensible message is
always "You can be just like me."i9 Her implicit message, however, is
"Dream on!" 1 have to admit, that for all my feminist pretensions, she
makes me green with envy.
Consequently, the press typically describe this successful
entrepreneur, publisher, television personality, and former CEO of a
New York Stock Exchange-listed corporation by such condescending
terms as "homemaking," "domestic" or "lifestyle
queen,
"guru,"22 or "diva."23 But, how could she complain when this is
precisely the image she has promoted?

17 As argued in a Wall Street Journal piece appearing the first

trading day after the

conviction;
„
^
,
The culture demands scapegoats after periods of excess. So prosecutors and a
convinced jury—made an example of Martha Stewart
The trial, of comse, had
nothing to do with individual investors losing money. Instead, it was ahout how Ms.
Stewart and her brokers dealt with prosecutors, who were legitimately demanding
honesty. Nevertheless, [a juror's] comments perfectly capture a general sense of
outrage. Martha, by dint of her famous persona, seems to have been convicted, m part,
of Trading While Rich.
wait ct i
Jesse Eisinger, The Show Goes On: Show Trials are Easier than Lasting Reform, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 8,2004, at CI.
,
.
18 Stewart Image Coming Under Attack, CNN.com
June 25
2002
n
http://www.cnn.coni/2002/SHOWBlZ/News/06/25/martha.stewart (last visited Mar. 24, 2005)
tfisreimftsx Image Coming Under Attack],
19 Paula
Span, Martha: In the Soup, GOTRIAD.com, Mar. 16, 2003, at
httD://www.gotriad.com/article/articleview/3361/l/20/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
20 Martha Stewart in Hot Water Over Possible Insider Trading, BONGO NEWS, June 19,
2002, available at http://www.bongonews.coni/layoutl.php?event=178.
21 Image Coming Under Attack, supra note 18.
22 Judge in Trial Threat to Waksal, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at 27.
23 Cox, supra note 4, at A17.
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The Passions Defined

It is my thesis that the confused analysis that treats
misappropriation or "outsider trading" as equivalent to classic "insider
trading" reflects the common conflation of envy and jealousy.
Although the two passions overlap, they are analytically distinct. Most
importantly, the ethical dimensions of the two are completely diverse.
Since at least the sixth century when St. Gregory the Great added it to
his list, envy has been considered one of the seven deadly sins^'^—^not
merely a wrongful act, but a disposition that corrupts the soul and serves
as the occasion of additional sins.^^ Ethics suggests that we should,
therefore, distinguish between the two. According to both theology and
psychoanalytic theory, the difficulty in isolating envy from jealousy lies
in the fact that envy, albeit radically evil, lies at the heart of human
nature.
1.

Envy as Deadly Sin

St. Augustine famously argued in his Confessions that the presence
of envy in the heart of even the youngest children was evidence of the
imiversality of Original Sin.^^ He called envy "the diabolical sin."^^
This concept builds on St. Paul's statement in the First Letter to the
Corinthians that "Love envieth not."^^
The Catholic Catechism identifies envy, along with avarice, as the
concern of the tenth, and final Commandment—thou shalt not covet thy
neighbor's property. According to the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops: "The tenth commandment concerns the intentions of
the heart;... it summarizes all the precepts of the Law."^^ The
Catechism defines envy as:

24 See Mary Ashwin, . . Against All Other Virtue and Goodness" An Exploration of Envy
in Relation to Concepts of Sin, available at http://www.human-nature.com/fi-eeassociations/ashwin.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
25 Neu holds out the hope that there can be admiring envy as well as malicious envy. "In the
case of admiring envy, one wishes to raise oneself (to become like the other)." Jerome Neu,
Jealous Thoughts, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note 13, at 434. I do not believe that this
form of admiration accurately fits within the category of envy. As even Neu admits, what he calls
admiring envy "may have different instinctual sources and developmental paths" than malicious
envy. Id.
25 See infra text at notes 57-60.
27 St. Augustine, De catechizandis rudibus.
28 I Corinthians 13.4 (American Standard Version).
29 UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH, Article 10, The Tenth Commandment, ^ 2534, available at http://www.nccbuscc.org/

catechism/text/pt3sect2chpt2artl0.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).

2005]

ENVY AND OUTSIDER TRADING

2031

[T]he sadness at the sight of another's goods and the immoderate
desire to acquire them for oneself, even unjustly. When it wishes
grave harm to a neighbor it is a mortal sin . . . .
Envy represents a form of sadness and therefore a refusal of
charity.^"
Envy is both ethically and "historicaily" the second deadly sin,
next only to pride.^^ According to a standard interpretation of the Bible
the first sin in the universe was Lucifer's pride that led him to lead the
revolt of the rebel angels against God. The second sin was Lucifer's
envy of Adam and Eve. Driven to destroy their happiness, Lucifer, in
the form of the serpent, appealed to their pride—^the first human sin—
and seduced them into disobedience. That is, the serpent convinced Eve
that if she ate of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, she
would become like God. This led, once again, to envy as the second
human sin when Cain, infuriated by his envy at Abel's good fortune,
killed his brother. Consequently, the Bible states that "by the envy of
the Devil, death entered into the world, and who are of his portion make
trial thereof."^^
In the twentieth century, psychoanalysts Sigmund Freud and
Jacques Lacan seized on this tradition to make envy central to
psychoanalytic theory. Lacan's followers have argued that envy is not
merely an individual sin, but the source of racism, anti-semitism,
terrorism, and the other horrors of contemporary life. Melanie Klein
hased a large part on her psychoanalytic theory on the concept of envy,
which she describes as "the angry feeling that another person possesses
and enjoys something desirable—the envious impulse being to take it
away or to spoil it."^^ She contrasts it to its opposite, "gratitude."^'^ She
offers a psychoanalytic reason "why envy ranks among the seven
'deadly sins'" and "suggests[s] that it is unconsciously felt to be the
greatest sin of all, because it spoils and harms the good object which is
the source of life."^^
Envy is a particularly cancerous sin in that its goal is nothing but
the destruction of the good. In Chaucer's words, "[i]t is the worst of
sins as it sets itself against all other virtues and goodness ...
As the
Ulanovs explain:

30 Id. M 2539-40.
3' See Ashwin, supra note 24.
32 WISDOM OF SOLOMON 2:24 (American Standard Version).
33 MELANIE KLEIN, ENVY AND GRATITUDE AND OTHER WORKS 1946-1963, at 176, 181
(1984).

34 Id. at 186-88.
35 Id. at 189.
36 GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES (The Parson's Tale), quoted in Ashwin,

supra note 24.
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At first glance, envy seems to differ from other sins because they
each point to a goal in itself not evil, except when indulged to excess.
Gluttony is hunger gone wild, for example. Lust is sexual desire run
rampant. Anger is self-assertion enraged. In contrast, envy presents
itself as feeling demeaned by another's good fortune and wanting to
belittle the other's good to protect oneself. Envy wants to make
something alive into something dead.^'

2.

Jealousy and Theft of Property

Jealousy is the fear and anger one feels that a rival will steal away
that which is rightfully hers. Envy is the rancor and bitterness one feels
when observing the good fortune of another. As Mary Ashwin
describes it:
[E]nvy comes from
the Latin invidere: to look upon
maliciously
[I]t is the feeling of mortification when we
contemplate another's advantages; it is the need to spitefully criticize
and denigrate; it is the fear that others are getting more than their fair
share.^^

She continues:
Jealousy is the affect in a triangular situation when a person fears
that something that they believe belongs to them has been or is about
to be taken away. Essentially the difference between envy and
jealousy is that envy is between two objects; jealousy between
three.^^

Klein describes the distinction as follows:
[Ejnvy implies the subject's relation to one person
only
Jealousy is based on envy, but involves a relation to at
least two people; it is mainly concerned with love that the subject
feels is his due and has been taken away, or is in danger of being
taken away, from him by his rival.'"'
In Neu's words:
Jealousy is typically over what one possesses and fears to lose, while
envy may be over something one has never possessed and may never
hope to possess. Going with this, the focus of envy is typically the
other person, rather than the particular thing or quality one is envious
over (a thing that may not in itself even be desirable to the envier,
whatever its perceived value to the present possessor)."^'

37 ANA ULANOV & BARRY ULANOV, CINDERELLA AND HER SISTERS: THE ENVIED AND THE
ENVYING 91 (1993).

38
39
40
41

Ashwin, supra note 24.
Id
KLEIN, supra note 33, at 181.
Jerome Neu, Jealous Thoughts, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note 13, at 432-33.
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In other words, the difference between jealousy and envy is that
the former is triangular while the latter is bilateral. That is, the jealous
party is concerned to protect or obtain the possession of an object oj
desire to the exclusion of a real or imagined rival.^^ The jealous is
concerned with insuring her own jouissance—a technical
psychoanalytic term that for our limited purposes can be somewhat
inaccurately translated as "enjoyment." In contrast, the envious is
concerned with preventing or destroying the jouissance of the other.
The envious does not so much want to obtain, possess, or enjoy t e
object of desire for its own sake. Rather, the envious just wants to
destroy the rival's excess enjoyment in her object by taking it away or
destroying it.
.
j • tThe difference between jealousy and envy is illustrated in Freud s
interpretation of the story of the judgment of Solomon. As is well
known it is recounted in the book of Kings that two prostitutes living
together, perhaps in the same brothel,''^ gave birth to boys within days
of each other. One of the women came to Solomon alleging that the
child of the other woman died "because she lay on it
The mother of
the dead boy took its corpse and laid it by the side of the plaintiff while
stealing the living child and placing it in the defendant's bed^ When
arose in the morning to nurse my child, behold, it was dead; but when I
looked at it closely in the morning, behold, it was not the child I had
bome.'"^5 Solomon, of course, ordered:
"Divide the child in two, and give half to the one, and half to the
other." Then the woman whose son was alive said to the king,
because her heart yearned for her son, "Oh, my lord, give her the
living child, and by no means slay it." But the other said, It shall be
neither mine nor yours; divide it." The king answered and said,
"Give the living child to the first woman, and by no means slay it;
she is its mother." And all Israel heard of the judgment which the
king had rendered; and they stood in awe of the king, because they
perceived that the wisdom of God was in him, to render justice.

42 Neu maintains that "DJealousy is typically over people while envy
Qualities " Id at 433 As a Hegelian, I find this analysis to be backwards, and argue that jealousy
Sies more^^aro^^^^^^^
to tLgs. Indeed, when a person is the object of jealousy, this
orecisely that the jealous treats the person who is the object of his desire as precisely &at an
Liect In other words, Neu believes that jealousy with respect to things is the treataent of
Sects aTsSects, wh;reas 1 believe that jealousy with respect to people is the treatment of
subjects as objects.
43

They"dwell[ed]inthesamehouse."

lXmgs3:16.

44 Id Today, we would probably assume that the unfortunate infant succumbed to Sudden
Infant Death Syndrome. Traditionally however, it was assumed that the infan was smothered
leiuse Wrwhrrish mother rolled over him while in a drunken stupor or while entertaining a
client. This was how this story was told to me in Sunday school.
45 Id at 3:21.
46 Id at 3:25-28.
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Solomon is extolled for his wisdom in identifying the true mother
by her concern for the child. A supposedly more sophisticated version
of this is that Solomon wisely identified, not necessarily the biological
parent of the child, but the woman who would be a better parent.
Freud correctly points out the fallaciousness of this interpretation.
The fact that the plaintiff tried to protect the innocent child neither
proved that she was his mother nor that she was even benevolent. All it
showed was that she was not psychotic.
Rather, Solomon's wisdom lay in his identification of which
woman was more likely to harm the child in the future. Solomon was,
in effect, testing the truth of the plaintiffs accusation. The only
possible explanation for the behavior charged by the plaintiff was that
the defendant was envious to the point of madness. A woman who
would steal the child of another could not be driven by jealousy. She
could not fear losing her own son—this had already happened—and no
one else's child could be a substitute for the uniqueness of an individual
who had been lost. Rather, bereft of the joys of motherhood, the
defendant could not bear to see the plaintiffs joy. The defendant stole
the living child not so that she would have him, but so that the plaintiff
would not. Solomon understood that ordering the death of the living
child would reveal the true jouissance of the defendant. And indeed,
the defendant's enjoyment was in destruction—envy. In contrast, the
jouissance of a "true" mother would be the love of her child. She might
be expected to be jealous—frantic that that which by right belonged to
her (her child) might be taken by a rival—^but her love should overcome
this jealousy if she thought that the altemative was losing her child
through death.
• u^i
Envy is always sinful. In contrast, jealousy can be either nghtful
or wrongful. For example, Yahweh correctly describes His passion as
jealousy, not envy. By definition, God's passions are righteous. The all
powerful, all confident Yahweh could not conceivably be envious of
Baal and the other false gods. And yet. He can fear that His chosen, but
weak, people might be seduced away by the idols. The history
recounted by the Bible suggests that this fear was frequently justified.^^

47 In recent times, Ian Ayres and Eric Talley have suggested an egregiously incorrect
interpretation of this story. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a
Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995).
48 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, in 18 THE STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 67, 120-21 (James
Strachey et al. eds., 1974); John Forrester, Psychoanalysis and the History of the Passions: The
Strange Destiny of Envy, in FREUD AND THE PASSIONS 127, 128-29 (John O'Neill ed., 1996).
49 For example, Solomon, because of the love of his "many foreign woman ... seven hundred
wives, princesses, and three hundred concubines ... tumed away his heart after other gods; and
his heart was not wholly true to the Lord his God
" 1 Kings 11:1-5.
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Jealousy can be wrong if it is unjustified or misplaced. An
example of the former is the jealous spouse irrationally fears that his
faithful spouse will betray him.
The classic illustration of the
distinction between wrongful jealousy and envy is the contrast between
Othello and lago—^the envious lago is evil, the jealous Othello merely
tragic.^"
Many misogynist practices—such as purdah—are the
institutionalization of unjustified jealousy.
When it is misplaced, the jealous party may have no rightful claim
to the object to desire. The phenomenon of stalking is a fnghtening
example of wrongful jealousy—the stalker fears the "loss" of the
beloved who, in fact, never was his. Moreover, stalking is the point
where wrongful jealousy threatens to pass over to envy—as when
Othello strangles Desdemona.
C.

Psychoanalysis

Envy plays a central role in the psychoanalytic tradition associated
with Freud. Freud's theory of the role of penis envy in the feminine
psyche is notorious. His followers take a more radical position. For
example, without denying Freud's account of penis envy in the oedipal
stage of development, Klein argues that envy is an essential
constitutional basis of all personality, masculine and feminine, that
arises much earlier in the infant's development and derives from the
child's empirical experience of the maternal breast (or substitute). It is
"operative from the beginning of life."5i Lacan takes Freud's analysis
of envy to an even higher, philosophic level.
I find Freud and Klein's accounts of the origins unsatisfactory
because they claim to be empirical and, therefore, deterministic.
Lacan's account, in contrast, is theoretical and retrospective. That is,
Freud seems to believe that children go through a stage in their lives
when they literally wish to have sex with their mothers and kill their
fathers. Girls literally are so impressed with the sight of a penis that
they feel lacking the rest of their lives. Lacan, in contrast, states that
"the Oedipus complex is Freud's dream. Like all dreams it needs to be
interpreted."^^ indeed, according to Lacan, even Oedipus did not have
an Oedipal complex.^^

50 Jerome Neu, Jealous Thoughts, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note 13, at 432-33.
51 KLEIN, supra note 33, at 176.
52 JACQUES LACAN, SEMINAIRE LIVRE XVII: L'ENVERS DE LA PSYCHANALYSE 159 (JacquesAlain Miller ed., 1991).
53 See Jacques LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN BOOK VIE THE ETHICS OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS 1959-1960, at 304 (Dennis Porter trans. & Jacques-Alain Miller ed., 1992)
(1988).
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Similarly, Klein's object psychology is based on the proposition
that from the time of birth children literally form relationships based on
the mother's breast. She quoted approvingly Freud's analogy of
psychoanalysis to archeology:
His [the psycho-analyst's] work of constmction, or, if it is preferred,
of reconstmction, resembles to a great extent an archaeologist s
excavation of some dwelling-place that has been destroyed and
buried or of some ancient edifice. The two processes are in fact
identical, except that the analyst works under better conditions and
has more material at his command to assist him, since what he is
dealing with is not something destroyed but something that is still
alive—and perhaps for another reason as well. But just as the
archaeologist builds up the walls of the building from the
foundations that have remained standing, determines the number and
position of the columns from depressions in the floor and
reconstmcts the mural decorations and paintings from the remains
found in the debris, so does the analyst proceed when he draws his
inferences from ... the behaviour of the subject of the analysis.^'*
The advantage to this approach is also its disadvantage—it arguably
makes their theories falsifiable. If one studied infants and could show
that they did not literally go through these stages, then the theories
would be disproved.
Lacan, in contrast, works not only within the psychoanalytic
tradition but also within the speculative philosophical tradition that is
based on a study of human freedom."
Consequently, he seeks to
eliminate any remaining biological determinism from Freud's theory.
He seeks not to recover the child who once was, but to help the adult
understand the person she is now. Lacan, following Hegel and Kant,
posits that if the subject is essentially free, it is because subjectivity is
nothing but a radical negativity. That is, the subject is subjected to no
boundaries only because it has no positive characteristics. The Oedipal
romance is, in a Lacanian reading, a sort of false-autobiography that we
retroactively tell ourselves in order to explain, and give affirmative
content to, our essential emptiness. Its very determinism is comforting
not only because it seems to explain the modem subject's feeling of
alienation, but also because it places the blame for her condition
elsewhere. As I shall explain in the next section, envy is one possible
reaction that a subject can have when she is forced to confront her
constituent negativity.

54 KLEIN, supra note 33, at 177-78 (quoting SIGMUND FREUD, CONSTRUCTIONS IN ANALYSIS
(1937)).
55 I explain this at length in Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Stumbling Block: Freedom, Rationality
and Legal Scholarship, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263 (2002), and shall give only an abbreviated
account of Lacan's theory in the immediately following section.
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Lacan

The centrality of envy in Lacan's psychoanalytic theory can be
seen in his repeated references to a passage in the Confessions of St.
Augustine.56 Ag noted, St. Augustine answered the critics of the
doctrine of original sin who maintained a romantic belief in the
innocence of children with the following anecdote. "I myself have seen
and known even a baby envious; it could not speak, yet it turned pale
and looked bitterly on its foster-brother."" Lacan explains how the
passion identified by Augustine, which is sometimes translated as
"jealousy," is more correctly understood as "envy." Lacan points out
that the word envy, the Latin "invidia " comes, in turn, from videre—io
see.^^ It is the passion felt in seeing the enjoyment of the other.
In order to understand what invidia is in its function as gaze it must
not be confused with jealousy. What the small child, or whoever,
envies is not at all necessarily what he might want—avoir envie, as
one improperly puts it. Who can say that the child who looks at his
younger brother still needs to be at the breast? Everyone knows that
envy is usually aroused by the possession of goods which would be
of no use to the person who is envious of them, and about the true
nature of which he does not have the least idea.^^
That is, Augustine's point is not that the child jealously fears the loss of
the maternal breast. The bitter child has already been weaned and is
well-fed. Rather, it is the very sight of his brother's enjoyment that fills
him with envy. Consequently, he does not want to regain the breast,
just to take it away from his hated little brother. This is sin.
Lacan agrees with Augustine that envy needs to be guarded against
because it leads not only to personal and social evils, but also because it
is constitutive of personality itself and, therefore, particularly invidious.
A full account of Lacanian theory is far beyond the scope of this
Article. For our purposes suffice it to say that Lacan goes beyond
Freud's theory of penis envy and Klein's theory of breast envy, with
their lingering aura of crude biological determinism. Lacan posits that
56 As discussed by Shuli Barzilai, "[References to the anecdote appear in Lacan's writings
from The Family Complexes (1938) to Encore (1973)." Shuli Barzilai, Augustine in Contexts:
Lacan's Repetition of a Scene From the Confessions, 11 LIT. & THEOLOGY 201 (1997).
57 "'Vidi ego et expertus sum zelantem parvulum, non dum loquehatur, et intuebatur pallidus
amaro aspectu conlactaneum suum." THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 11 (Edward B.
Pusey trans. & Charles W. Eliot eds., 1909). In this passage, rather than using the more common
"invidere," Augustine uses the relatively unusual word "zelantem" which some other translators
have rendered as "jealousy." See, e.g., Barzilai, supra note 56. As Lacan's analysis explains, the
immediately following text explains that Augustine is referring to the passion that I am calling
envy, not jealousy.
58 See JACQUES LACAN, FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 116 (Alan
Sheridan trans. & Jacques-Alain Miller ed., 1981).
59 Id.
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the very initiation of the subjeet into the symbolic realm of language,
law and sexuality "splits" the subject leaving her with an insatiable
feeling of lack.^" Or, more accurately, as I have said elsewhere, the
"subject is split" is not so much a description but a definition—
subjectivity is nothing but an internal, constituent emptiness or
splitting.®'
To oversimplify, following Hegel, Lacan thought that subjectivity
could only be created through intersubjective relationships with
others—what he called the symbolic order of the big O t h e r . T h e
subject is nothing but this hollow shell that gains content from the
outside. Consequently, one's most intimate self lies external to oneself.
Lacan coined the neologism "extimacy" to describe the uncanny sense
of one's own self-alienation.®^ This constitutive lack appears even more
negative when one realizes that the Other who gives the subject content
also "does not exist."®'' That is, the intersubjective order of the
symbolic has no pre-existing, objective, and permanent essence but
consists merely of a contingent, intersubjective, and temporary
appearance of specific, fleeting social relations among a community of
split subjects.
Lacan will eventually combine his insight that the subject is split,
and that the Other does not exist, to formulate his single most
controversial slogan "Woman does not exist."®® Although frequently
dismissed as misogyny, Lacan's statement is more correctly interpreted
as a statement of the human condition. To Lacan, true subjectivity is
I explain this phenomenon at length elsewhere. See, e.g., JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE
VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY AND THE FEMININE (1998) [hereinafter
SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL]; JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS: THE EROTICS OF
THE MARKET (2003) [hereinafter SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS]; Jeanne L. Schroeder,
The Midas Touch: The Lethal Effect of Wealth Maximization, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 687, 731-35
[hereinafter Schroeder, The Midas Touch]; Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A
Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 505-06 (1998) [hereinafter
Schroeder, The End of the Market]. The following text in the main body is an abbreviated
version of these more complete discussions.
6' See Jeaime L. Schroeder, The Four Discourses of Law: A Lacanian Analysis of Legal
Practice and Scholarship, 79 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2000) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Four
Discourses]; see also BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND
JOUISSANCE 45 (1995).
62 I explicate Hegel and Lacan's theory of the formation of subjectivity extensively in
SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 60, at 1-106 and Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora's
Amphora: The Ambiguity of Gift, 46 UCLA L. REV. 815, 860-62 (1999) [hereinafter Schroeder,
Pandora's Amphora].
63 In French, extimite. Jearme L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Kenneth Starr:
Diabolically Evil?, 88 CAL. L. REV. 653, 659-60 n.31 (2000). See generally Jacques-Alain
Miller, Extimite (Franfoise Massardier-Kenney trans.), in LACANIAN THEORY OF DISCOURSE:
SUBJECT, STRUCTURE AND SOCIETY 74 (March Bracher et al. eds., 1994).
64 Miller, supra note 63, at 81.
65 JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK XX: ENCORE, ON FEMININE
SEXUALITY, THE LIMITS OF LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE 1972-1973, at 72-74 (Bruce Fink trans. &
Jacques-Alain Miller ed., 1998).

ENVY AND OUTSIDER TRADING
feminine in nature—^the feminine is the part of personality that
internalizes the fact of her own negativity-^® The masculine is the part
that denies the truth. Or, to paraphrase Lacanian philosopher Slavoj
:£izek, a man is a woman who thinks she exists.®^
The subject seeks an explanation of her sense of lack by
formulating a retroactive account (an abduction or retroduction) of what
must have happened. One way she does this is by identifying her lack
of enjoyment (completion) with the excess enjoyment of someone else.
She obsesses on the other's enjoyment and concludes that not only does
the other enjoy, he does so excessively while she, in contrast, is lacking.
She speculates that the reason why she lacks enjoyment and the other
enjoys too much must be that the other has stolen her enjoyment. In
^izek's words:
What we conceal by imputing to the Other the theft of enjoyment is
the traumatic fact that we never possessed what was allegedly stolen
from us: the lack ("castration") is originary, enjoyment constitutes
itself as "stolen," or, to quote Hegel's precise formulation from his
Science of Logic, it "only comes to be through being left behind."^^
This is a false autobiography. Through this self-serving account, the
subject tries to disguise her sinful envy as righteous jealousy—XhQXQhy
shifting the blame from herself to the "thieving" other. This is both
sinful and unjust.
Lacanians have extended and applied Lacan's theory of excess
enjoyment to the political field. We associate the other who has excess
enjoyment with other groups with which we are proximate. We
concentrate on the difference in the way the other, with his strange
customs, enjoys. For example, Jacques-Alain Miller, Lacan's son-inlaw and editor, states:
Now, what we are attempting to see is what makes the Other other,
that is, what makes it particular, different, and in this dimension of
alterity of the Other, we find war. Racism, for example, is precisely
a question of the relation to an Other as such, conceived in its
difference. And it does not seem to me that any of the generous and
rmiversal discourses on the theme of "we are all fellow beings" have
had any effectiveness conceming this question. Why? Because
racism calls into play a hatred that is directed precisely toward what
grounds the Other's alterity, in other words, its jouissance. If no
decision, no will, no amount of reasoning is sufficient to wipe out
racism, this is indeed because it is founded on the point of extimacy
of the Other.

66 See SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 60, at 328-29.
67 See SLAVOJ 2IZEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 75 (1989).
68 SLAVOJ IHEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE; KANT, HEGEL, AND THE CRITIQUE OF
IDEOLOGY 203-04 (1993).
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It is not simply a mater of an imaginary aggressivity that, itself, is
directed at fellow beings. Racism is founded on what one imagines
about the Other's jouissance\ it is hatred of the particular way, of the
Other's own way, of experiencingyowz'ssance. . . . However, what is
really at stake is that he takes his jouissance in a way different from
ours. Thus the Other's proximity exacerbates racism: as soon as
there is closeness, there is a confrontation of incompatible modes of
jouissance. For it is simple to love one's neighbor when he is
distant, but it is a different matter in proximity.
Racist stories are always about the way in which the Other obtains
a plus-de-jouir. either he does not work or he does not work enough,
or he is useless or a little too useful, but whatever the case may be,
he is always endowed with a part of jouissance that he does not
deserve. Thus true intolerance is the intolerance of the Other's
jouissance.^^

As Lacan says (in explanation of Augustine's anecdote):
Such is true envy—^the envy that makes the subject pale before the
image of a completeness closed upon itself, before the idea that the
petit a, the separated a from which he is hanging, may be for another
the possession that gives satisfaction . ..

Note that the theory of the relationship between the theory of
excess enjoyment and racism lies precisely at the moment at which
jealousy passes into envy—or, more accurately, when the guilty subject
tries to disguise her sinful and deceitful envy as righteous jealousy. The
subject pretends to be jealous—she tries to insist that the reason she is
angry is because the Other has taken away that which is rightfully hers.
But in her heart, she knows that her lack is constituent and is not caused
by the absence of any specific thing. Consequently, what she really
feels is envy. She is incensed at the supposed enjoyment of the Other in
which she cannot participate.
All she can do, therefore, is try to destroy the other's enjoyment.
Unfortunately, because the subject identifies the other's enjoyment with
the other's alterity (i.e., whatever it is that distinguishes the other from
the subject) destruction of the other's enjoyment requires the destruction
of the other. Accordingly, in Lacan's late seminar. Encore, Lacan
invents the neo-logism 'jealouissance" for the envy of the excess
enjoyment (jouissance) of the other first identified by Augustine.^'
Historically, as demonstrated in such examples of Lynch mobs, the
Holocaust, the Serbian wars and, today, Islamacism and, perhaps.
President Bush's invocation to the "Axis of Evil," this impulse becomes
literal as political reality.

69 Miller, supra note 63, at 79-80.
^0 LACAN, supra note 58, at 116.
71 See LACAN, supra note 65, at 100.

ENVY AND OUTSIDER TRADING
E.

2041

Law

Freud identified envy as the souree of our sense of social justice.
"If one cannot be the favourite oneself, at all events nobody else shall
be the favourite."''^ But Freud thinks that humans are not naturally herd
animals with benevolent social instincts." Liberal legal theory, as well
as Lacanian psychoanalysis, suggests that the matter is more
complicated. Social justice requires that we distinguish righteous
jealousy from destructive envy—^we must not merely claim property
rights for ourselves, we must respect the property of others. As I have
already quoted: "That envy may be one reason for demanding equality
does not mean that demands for equality are unjustified.""
Although I base my legal theory on the super-liberalism of Hegel,
this is equally true of classic liberal theory associated with Locke. To
Locke property is a natural right that pre-exists society." Under this
interpretation liberalism requires that we respect property rights. This
means that appropriate jealousy—^the protection of valid property
rights^^—is necessary even as envy—^the desire to destroy the property
rights of others—must be prohibited.
To Hegel, property and liberal society are self-constituting—
property is created by liberal society, but liberal society logically
requires property as its cornerstone.''^
This can be seen as a
fundamental principle of Hegel's philosophy of right. To Hegel, the
abstract individual posited by classical liberalism is too frail a creature
to act as a subject—a creature capable of bearing rights and interacting
in the symbolic order of society.'^ Related to this, he thinks that
subjectivity could not exist in the state of nature posited by liberalism
because one can only be a subject insofar as one is recognized as such
by another subject." Consequently, the person seeking subjectivity
must first seek to give other persons the status and dignity of
72 Freud, supra note 48, at 119-20.
73 See id
74
xwpra text at note 15.
75 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Umv.
Press 1988) (1690).
•
u- ,
u
76 Neu maintains that "the notion of 'possession' should not mislead us into thinking that
what is at stake is property rights. What is at stake is the self, is an individual's identity." Jerome
Neu, Jealous Thoughts, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note 13, at 448. A Hegelian would
agree with the second point, that jealousy concems the establishment of identify (or what 1 call
subjectivity) hut disagree with the assertion that jealousy does not involve property. To a
Hegelian, property is nothing hut a moment in the creation of subjectivity.
77 See SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 60, at 24; Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora,
supra note 62, at 861-64.
78 See Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora, supra note 62, at 862.
79 As Michel Rosenfeld says, according to Hegel "self-consciousness can only achieve
satisfaction in another self-consciousness." Michel Rosenfeld, Hegel and the Dialectics of
Contract, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1199, 1221 (1989).
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subjectivity—that is, subjectivity requires mutual recognition
For
reasons that are beyond the scope of this Article, Hegel argues that the
most basic and primitive regime of mutual recognition is the private law
of property and contract.^o This means that subjectivity does not so
much require that each individual claim and protect her own property
rights. Rather, she must first grant and respect the property rights of
others as a step in granting others the status of subjectivity.^'
As already introduced,^^ Lacan, following Hegel, believes that
even as the subject is alienated and envious, she is also essentiaUy
social—her subjectivity is created by, and only exists within,
intersubjective relationships with other subjects in the symbolic order
(the big Other). As Hegel argues, in the modem liberal Constitutional
state, this intersubjective order is sustained by a regime of property
the possession, enjoyment, and exchange of actual and imaginaty
objects of enjoyment.83 Consequently, although the subject may on the
one hand want to destroy the possession and enjoyment of the other, on
the other hand she requires the existence of a property regime that
allocates objects among subjects. In this sense, jealousy is as important
to her constitution as envy. Jealousy is necessary in that it helps
maintain the intersubjective regime of property. Envy, in contrast, is
self-contradictory in that it threatens to destroy the regime of property
that is necessary for the subject's self-constitution.
This does not mean that society should necessarily respeet any and
all claims to property or that we should perpetuate the status quo of
wealth and property distribution. The question is, how do we tell the
difference between rightful and wrongful jealous claims to property,
and between rightful jealous claims to property, and wrongful envious
desires to destroy the property of others? Hegel argues that a property
regime is a necessary and appropriate element of the modem liberal
state, but he offers no advice as to what specific allocation of property is

80 See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 70 (H.B. Nisbet trans.
& Allen w. Wood ed., 1991).
A person, in distinguishing himself from himself, relates himself to another person,
and indeed it is only as owners of property that the two [persons] have existence ... tor
each other. Their identity in themselves acquires existence . .. through the transference
of the property of the one to the other by common will and with due respect of the
rights of both—that is, by contract.
81 Consequently, Hegel believes that only the "most uncultured," "stubborn," and
"emotionally limited" people "insist most strongly on their nghts." Id. at 69. I explain this
dialectic in Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora, supra note 62, at 873-82; SCHROEDER, THE VEST ,
supra note 60, at 49-52.
82
it/pra text at notes 62-64.
,. „ ,,
83 This is the subject of the first section of Philosophy of Right. I explam Hegel s argument
in SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 60, at 15-52 and Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora, supra
note 62, at 864-70.
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correct.^'^ He leaves this, as he does with all policy decisions, to
pragmatic reasoning and positive law.®^
We can now return to the law of insider trading.

III.

INSIDER TRADING

A.

Fraud

Disputes arise over the proper scope of prohibitions against
securities trading on the basis of material non-public information
because of the simple, albeit surprising, fact that the federal securities
laws neither define, nor expressly prohibit, "insider trading."^®
Consequently, in the absence of Congressional action, if the SEC, the
DOJ, plaintiffs, and the courts believe that trading on the basis of
material non-public information should be unlawful, they must imply
appropriate rules jfrom the general language and policy of the statutes,
combined with case law developed under the very different legal
regimes of state corporate and trade secrets law. Indeed, this is the
single most disturbing aspect of insider trading law—it is essentially a
common law federal crime. This jurisprudential objection is beyond the
scope of the specific argument of this Article, although it obviously
informs it.
Both proponents and opponents of prohibitions on insider trading
base their arguments on policies that they wished the law would follow,
rather than on policies that the statute actually reflects.
To

It is a common misperception that Hegel, like Locke, jtistified property on the basis of first
appropriation. See, e.g., STEVEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 69-70 (1990). As I argue
elsewhere, this is a misreading of a single sentence in the beginning of Philosophy of Right taken
out of context. If one reads further to his discussion of "wrong," Hegel expressly rejects the firstappropriation justification of specific property claims. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL, supra note 60,
at 41 n.l24; Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Appearance of Wrong and the
Essence of Right: Metaphor and Metonymy in Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2481 (2003); Jeanne L.
Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel on Personality and Intellectual Property (2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cardozo Law Review) [hereinafter Schroeder,
Unnatural Rights\
85 In Hegel's famous formulation from the introduction to Philosophy of Right, because his
logic is retroactive in nature, philosophy always comes "too late" to give policy advice. HEGEL,
supra note 80, at 23; see Schroeder, The Stumbling Block, supra note 55, at 323-25.
86 In 1984 and 1988, Congress amended the 1934 Act by adding provisions imposing civil
liabilities on, and providing for a private right of action for persons trading contemporaneously
with "any person who has violated any provision of this chapter or the rules or regulations
thereunder by purchasing or selling a security ... while in possession of material, non-public
information in, or has violated any such provision by communicating such information." 15
U.S.C. §§ 78t-I, 78u-l (2000). Although this language reflects Congress's agreement that some
forms of insider trading should be restricted, this legislation begs the question of exactly what
forms should be restricted.

2044

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:5

oversimplify,proponents of rules against insider trading tend to base
their objections on the intuition that it is immoral, unfair, or, as
expressed in the title of Kim Sheppele's classic article. It s Just Not
RightCritics and opponents of prohibitions on insider trading tend to
rely on an economic analysis of law that seeks to promote efficient
securities markets.The problem with both approaches is that neither
of the two primary securities acts—the Securities Act of 1933 (the
"1933 Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934
Act")—contain any language expressly imposing either fairness or
efficiency criteria with respect to the issuers of securities and their
affiliates.90 Consequently, while arguments made on fairness or
efficiency grounds may be of great academic interest and would be
relevant if Congress were considering a major overhaul of the
The Article is not intended as a comprehensive treatment of the voluminous scholarship on
insider trading, merely as an introduction to certain recurring themes. For two recent articles diat
survey the literature, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading:
Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443 (2001) and
Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctionallnsider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491 (1999).
As many have pointed out before me, this is an area of law that has been characterized more by
incoherence than any reasoned justification. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Insider trading and
Contracting: A Critical Response to the 'Chicago School,' 1986 DUKE L.J. 628 (1986); Jill E.
Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L.
REV. 179 (1991); Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic
Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35 (1986); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information:
Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAE. L. REV. 1413 (1992).
88 Kim Sbeppele, It's Just Not Right: The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 123 (1993); see also Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider
Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375 (1999); Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of
Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. REV. 337 (1997); Cox, supra note 87; Gary Lawson, The Ethics of
Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 727 (1998); Alison Grey Anderson, Fraud,
Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341 (1982); Victor Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV.
322 (1979); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967).
89 See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REV.'857 (1983); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable
Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980); JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING:
ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY (1991); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian
Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to
Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984)
[hereinafter Macey, Fairness]; Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23
VAND. L. REV. 547 (1970) [hereinafter Manne, Insider Trading]; HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
90 Section 2 of the 1934 Act lists among the many reasons why regulation of the secunties
markets falls within the federal jurisdiction granted by tbe Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution the need "to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets' and the fact that
manipulation may "prevent the fair valuation of collateral for bank loans." 15 U.S.C. § 78b
(2000). None of the substantive provisions of that Act applicable to issuers or their control
persons, however, contains any express fairness standard.
This is in striking contrast to state corporate laws which, by statute or common law, impose
substantive fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care on corporate insiders and frequently apply
standards of ftmdamental fairness to corporate and insider behavior.
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regulatory regime, they are of less interest to the judge or lawyer who is
trying to interpret the existing statutes. In contrast, in this Article, I try
to analyze insider trading within the statutory policy of mandatory
disclosure of certain types of information by certain classes of legal
actors.
The Acts require issuers and certain other persons to make
disclosures and file forms with the SEC on certain occasions. The Acts
frequently impose liability on issuers and certain others for material
misstatements and certain material omissions.^' The Acts also include
general prohibitions against fraud^^ and manipulation.^^ Consequently,
whether or not certain forms of trading on the basis of material non
public information should be prohibited because they are unfair, or
permitted because they are efficient, the proponents of these positions
must word their arguments within language that either mandates
disclosure or prohibits fraud and manipulation. Indeed, most of the last
thirty years of insider trading case law can arguably be characterized as
an attempt by the Supreme Court to rein in the attempts by the SEC and
the lower federal courts to ground insider trading jurisprudence in non
statutory faimess considerations.'^ This history is well known among
securities lawyers and I shall only give an abbreviated account in this
Article.
1.

Faimess

The catch-all anti-fraud provision of the federal securities laws is
§ 10(b)'5 of the 1934 Act which makes it unlawful for a person to use the
jurisdictional means "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security... any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such mles and the regulations

9' For example, § 11 of the 1933 Act allows purchasers of securities sold pursuant to
materially misleading registration statements to recover the purchase price from the issuer, its
directors, the officers who signed the registration statements, and underwriters and professionals
who expertised a portion of the registration statement (i.e., usually the issuer's auditor). The
named defendants other than the issuer can raise the so-called "due-diligence" defense that they
did not know and did not have reasonable grounds to believe (in some circumstances, after
reasonable investigation) that the registration statement was misleading.
92 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j (2000).
93 See 15 U.S.C. § 78e.
94 This is eloquently expressed in the title of an article by Jonathan R. Macey that traces the
development of insider trading law; From Faimess to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules
Against Insider Trading. See Macey, Faimess, supra note 89. Indeed, since he was writing in
1984 after the Chiarella and Dirks opinions (discussed infra in text at notes 102-07, 120-24, 13339), Macey's choice of title is perhaps better described as prescient of the next twenty years.
95 15 U.S.C. §78j(b).
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as the Commission may prescribe . ..Rule lOb-5 promulgated under
this section provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instmmentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any imtrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.^®

Since the great retrenchment cases of Emst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder^'' and Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,^^ the Supreme
Coiul; has made it clear that § 10(b)'s litany "manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance" indicates that Congress was codifying the
traditional common law tort of deception, rather than proscribing
negligent or unfair behavior or constructive ffaud.^^ Although the
language of Rule lOb-5 is broader than that of § 10(b), under the basic
principles of administrative rulemaking, the rule should not be read
more expansively than the statute under which it is promulgated.'""
Consequently, Rule lOb-5 must also be limited to actual fraud.'"'
The Supreme Court applied this underlying principle to insider
trading in the seminal case of Chiarella v. United States.Because
96 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
97 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
98 430 U.S. 462(1977).
99 The specific issue considered in Emst & Emst was whether or not mere negligent behavior
could constitute a violation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The Supreme Court fovmd that the
language of the statute "connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud
investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities." Emst & Emst, 425 U.S.
at 199. Consequently, a plaintiff in a private right of action must establish that the defendant
acted with scienter. Id. at 201.
Santa Fe Industries considered whether a plaintiff could maintain a § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
cause of action against management of an issuer on the grounds that the terms of a merger were
unfair, and in breach of management's fiduciary duties without a showing that the defendants had
made a misstatement or omission of a material fact. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 464-65.
100 "The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the
administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law ...." As a consequence, the
scope of Rule lOb-5 "carmot exceed the power granted by the Commission by Congress under §
10(b)." Id. at 472-73.
191 See id.
102 445 U.S. 222 (1980). The Supreme Court was overruling the Second Circuit which had
sustained Chiarella's conviction on the ground that "[a]nyone—corporate insider or not—^who
regularly receives material non-public information may not use that information to trade in
securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose. And if he caimot disclose, he must
abstain from buying or selling." United States v. Chiarella, 558 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978),
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§ 10(b) only proscribes fraud the Court rejected the concept of "a
general duty between all participants in market transactions to forego
actions based on material, non-public information."'03 By doing so, the
Court also implicitly rejected the SEC's holding in In re Cady, Roberts
&
and the Second Circuit's opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
that implied that the rule against trading on non-public
information applied universally because it was grounded in preventing
unfairness.
In the Court's words, "not every instance of financial
unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity."'"? In other words, even if all
fraud is unfair, not all unfairness is fraudulent.
"Fraud" has many elements. In this Article, I concentrate only on
those that are most directly relevant to the issue at hand. First and
foremost,
fraud
requires
deception—misrepresentation,
or
nondisclosure, by the fraudster and reliance by the victim.'"^ To put this
in layperson's terms, deception is the allegation that "you intentionally
lied to me and I relied on your lies to my detriment."'""
Although the federal securities laws are designed to protect
investors and maintain the integrity of the securities markets, even after
the adoption of the much hyped Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,"" federal
law applicable to issuers is generally not paternalistic in the same way
that state law is. The federal securities laws generally applicable to
issuers'" have sometimes been termed "rotten egg" r u l e s . A
rev V, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
103 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
104 40 S.E.C. 907(1961).
105 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert, denied sub nam., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
106 The Supreme Court has never expressly overruled Cady, Roberts and has on occasion
stated that it accepts its basic principles including the principle of unfairness. See, e.g.. United
States V. Dirks, 463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983). Despite this, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that unfaimess alone does not impose prohibitions on the trading of material non-public
information. Rather fraud can only be established through the breach of a fiduciary-type duty.
107 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232.
108 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,476 (1977).
109 The Supreme Court has held that § 10(b) also covers manipulation but reads the word
"manipulation" as used in the statute as a "term of art" to refer to practices "that are intended to
mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity." Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 476.
That is, the Court limits "manipulation," as defined by the statute, like "fraud," to a form of actual
deception. Fraud, apparently, is deception through words, whereas manipulation also includes
deception through deeds.
I l l Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
111 The 1934 Act does contain paternalistic and substantive rules applicable to market
professionals such as registered brokers and dealers. In addition, the rules applicable to parties
(including issuers) engaged in tender offers do contain some substantive provisions {see, e.g., 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(f), 14d-7, 14d-ll (2004)) in addition to disclosure obligations. They also
contain a catch-all prophylactic provision that allows the SEC to adopt rules designed to prevent
fraud which is deemed broader than § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 (which only proscribe actual fraud).
See infra text at note 155.
112 See Panel Discussion, New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Securities Offerings, 28
Bus. LAW. 505 (1975) (quoting panelist A.A. Sommer, Jr.).
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substantive rule would prohibit the sale of rotten eggs (or, to put this in
a corporate context, to enter into a transaction unfair to shareholders).
In contrast, under the securities laws, "if the investor purchases the
'rotten eggs' on an informed basis, [the federal securities law] provides
no relief."'That is, issuers and insiders are allowed to treat investors
unfairly, so long as they inform investors what they are in for.
Consequently, under federal law, when a person speaks, she must not
only speak truthfully, she must also speak completely—^no lies, and no
half-truths. This standard appears in the language of Rule 10b-5(b)
quoted above that makes it unlawful "to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading.""''
2.

Silence

It is relatively simple to understand what this means as a practical
matter when a person makes an affirmative public statement—it must
be true and it must be complete. Virtually all alleged insider trading
cases, however, involve compete silence, rather than incomplete
statements—the trader trades without disclosing information in her
possession. The analysis is much more difficult to apply, both
practically and theoretically, in these cases. This is because Rule lOb-5
does not prohibit all omissions (silences) of material facts, but only
omissions "necessary in order to make the statements made... not
misleading." Consequently, the rule against omissions applies only
when either a person has spoken, but spoke incompletely, or if she has
failed to speak when she has a duty to speak. To find that a person is
guilty of unlawful insider trading under Rule lOb-5, therefore, we must
first find that the trader had a duty to make a statement.
The securities acts impose statutory disclosure obligations on
issuers and other actors in many circumstances. For example, under the
1934 Act issuers must file with the SEC quarterly reports on Form 10Q,'" annual reports on Form 10-K,"^ periodic reports on Form 8-K'"
and proxy statements pursuant to Regulation 14A."®
There is
considerable, but highly confusing, case law as to whether and when
Cheryl L. Wade, The Integration of Securities Offerings: A Proposed Formulation that
Fosters the Policies of Securities Regulation, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 199, 202 n.11 (1994) (referring
specifically to the Securities Act of 1933).
11'l See supra text at note 111.
115 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (2004).
116 M §249.310.
117 Id § 249.308.
11^ Id. § 240.14a-1 etseq.
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issuers and other persons must update these mandatory reports.
Insider trading cases almost always fall within the ambiguous gap
periods between mandatory statutory reports.
As Chiarella makes clear, the federal securities laws do not impose
"a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, non-public information."^2o xhat is,
silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may
operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b).... But such liability is
premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust
and confidence between parties to a transaction.
In other words, the mere possession of information giving a person an
"unfair advantage over less informed buyers and sellers"^22 (jges not
itself impose a duty to disclose or refrain from trading.'^s Examples of
persons who may have a duty to speak given by the Supreme Court
include traditional corporate insiders, agents, fiduciaries, and persons in
whom sellers of securities have "placed their trust and confidence."'^^
There is, according to the Court, no justification for imposing duties to
speak on "a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through
impersonal market transactions."'^^
If fraud requires deception, then this implies there must be some
person or class of persons who is deceived. The deceived person(s)
must have relied on the misrepresentation or omission to his detriment.
As I shall discuss below,'^6 one of the problems with the
misappropriation theory as developed to date is that it threatens to
disconnect these two interrelated aspects of the fraudster's deception—
the person to whom the duty to speak runs is not necessarily the person
who is deemed harmed by the omission. Ordinarily one would assume
that if securities fraud occurred by definition there should be at least one
person who could bring a private right of action under Rule lOb-5 for
securities fraud. But, under the misappropriation theory, there can be
no such plaintiff!

11' See, e.g., JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 749-54
(3d ed. 2001).
120 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
121 Id. at 230.
122 Id. at 232.
123 See id at 227.
124 Id. at 2n.
125 Id at 232-33.
126 See infra text at notes 164-82.
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Informational Advantages

One major theme that runs throughout this Article is that, even
among those who intuit that insider trading is unfair, there is no clear
consensus as to what is unfair about it, given certain basic premises of
our capitalist economic system, generally, and American intellectual
property law, specifically. Insider trading—the trading of securities on
the basis of certain material non-public information—is the economic
exploitation of an informational advantage by the possessor of the
information, to the disadvantage of the rest of the public. Consequently,
the regulation of insider trading can be seen as a limitation on
informational advantages in the name of a more egalitarian distribution
of information. But, neither American law generally, nor securities law
specifically, has a policy of parity of access to information, as the
Supreme Court expressly recognized in ChiarellaP'^ As I discuss
below,i28 informational advantages are frequently protected by our law
as "trade secrets."'^® As Henry Manne states rather sharply, but
accurately: "Lawyers especially, it would seem, should be very
circumspect about characterizing the utilization of superior information
as immoral. That is, after all, their stock in trade."i3o And indeed.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg will paradoxically attempt to ground her
misappropriation theory—^which reflects an egalitarian approach
towards non-public information—on trade secret law—^which grants
monopolistic rights in non-public information to specific legal actors.
My analysis leads to the conclusion both that Congress has been derelict
in failing to reconcile these two different regimes of ownership of
127 5ee445U.S. at 233.
'28 5ee mAo text at notes 163, 181-82,205-13.
129 As Manne correctly points out, one of the most important early insider trading cases, SEC
V. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev W, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
demonstrates the seemingly anomalous nature of insider trading law. In that case, the Second
Circuit held that it would have been unlawful for the insiders of an issuer to trade on issuer stock
on the basis of material information that the issuer had discovered a very valuable mineral strike.
"So notice the irony: [issuer] officials buying stock with knowledge of a new ore vein have
somehow done something immoral, but the company itself buying surrounding land, utilizing
precisely the same information, has merely performed in a business-like fashion.
Manne,
Insider Trading, supra note 89, at 550-51.
Manne ridicules the government's position: "nor will it do, as one high official of the SEC
tried, to distinguish these two cases on the not-so-obviously pertinent ground that 'after all, one
case involved land and the other securities.'" Id. at 551. Maime is correct that this statement
seems inane in that the SEC based its case on an intuition that exploitation of informational
advantages is somehow immoral. I argue, however, if insider trading law is instead based on the
allocation of property rights, then the SEC's distinction is both logically and legally defensible.
By adopting the federal securities laws Congress has, in effect, granted a property-like right to
certain information concerning securities, and only securities, to the investment public. It has
allowed state law to govem the law of information conceming land. See infra text at notes 19197.
'20 Manne, Insider Trading, supra note 89, at 551.
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material non-public information and that the resulting confusion has
encouraged the federal courts' inappropriate extension of insider trading
law beyond the scope of the disclosure and anti-fraud policies of the
securities laws.
How, then, do we reconcile these two competing approaches to the
law of informational advantages? I suggest that it is precisely the
contradictory approaches of securities and trade secret law that suggests
the answer to their reconciliation. Courts should apply insider trading
law only to that subset of information that our society has expressly or
implicitly allocated to the public. The public can justifiably be jealous
if a party tries to appropriate and exploit for his own personal benefit
such information that is rightfully public. In contrast, insider trading
prohibitions should not apply to that information that our society has
allocated to specific economic actors under trade secret law, or
otherwise. Any objection by the public to the owner's use of her non
public information is mere envy. The reason why the misappropriation
theory of insider trading law as articulated by Justice Ginsburg in
O'Hagan is so troublesome is precisely because it tries to base insider
trading—^the law of eliminating informational advantages—on trade
secret law—^the law of protecting informational advantages.
Of course, by positing my analysis in this form I am arguably
begging the essential policy question of what information should
properly be allocated to the public, and what should be allocated to
specific individuals. This is intentional. Such policy decisions are not
within the bailiwick of the federal courts or the SEC applying the
federal securities laws, but of Congress and the legislatures and
common law courts of the several states.
B.
1.

The Classic Theory
Classic Insiders

The classic theory of insider trading holds that it is a fraud for a
traditional corporate insider (such as an officer, director, senior
employee, or control person of a corporation) to trade on equity
securities issued by that corporation on the basis of material non-public
information obtained from the corporation.
This rule is rather
misleadingly known as the "disclose or refrain rule"i3i—if a traditional
insider is in possession of material non-public information, she must
either refrain from trading in equity securities of that corporation or she

131 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1071 (2003).
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must make the information publie before trading. This name is
misleading because the trader usually has no right, vis-a-vis the source,
to disclose the information. Consequently, as a practical matter, this
may more accurately be a "refrain rule."'32
Fitting this prohibition within the law of fraud is a stretch or,
more accurately, a contortion. The underlying problem is that rather
than seeking implied duties to disclose from within the language and
policy of the securities acts themselves, the courts and the SEC have
looked towards state corporate law. This is problematic because, as
mentioned, since at least Santa Fe and Chiarella, the Supreme Court
has held that the securities laws generally, and insider trading law
specifically, are designed only to require disclosure and to proscribe
fraud. State corporate law, in contrast, imposes fiduciary duties and
proscribes substantive unfaimess. It is not surprising, therefore, that a
duty of disclosure based on the latter will do an imperfect job in
furthering the policies of the former.
In finding that insider trading constitutes fraud, courts have
adopted a version of a common law rule of "special facts." Although
the cases are far from specific in explaining their reasoning, it seems to
be roughly as follows: sometimes a fiduciary or other person in a
confidential relationship has a duty to make disclosures to her
beneficiary. Consequently, a beneficiary is sometimes entitled to rely
on silence by the fiduciary as an implied negative representation. As
Justice Powell stated in United States v. Dirks-P^
In an inside-trading case this fraud derives from the "inherent
unfaimess involved where one takes advantage" of "information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone." . . . Thus, an insider will be liable under
Rule 1 Ob-5 for inside trading only where he fails to disclose material
non-public information before trading on it and thus makes "secret
profits."i34
Although rather confusingly worded in the language of fairness,
the Dirks opinion, in fact, reiterates the basic principal of Chiarella that
federal securities laws do not impose duties on market participants
generally merely because they are in possession of information.
Consequently, the Supreme Court exonerated the defendant (an alleged
tippee) m this case precisely because he was not subject to the duty to
disclose or abstain himself, and his tipper, who did have such a duty.
• '•
I discuss below, things are a little more complex in the ease of the most classic form of
msiders-directors and executive officers of the issuer. This is because, while these persons may
not have the nght to disclose corporate information in their personal eapaelties, in their corporate
Sosme
considerable ability to cause the issuer to make the appropriate
•33 463 U.S. 646(1983).
'34 Id. at 654 (citations omitted).
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did not violate his duty. By invoking "fairness" Powell seems to be
invoking state law which imposes fiduciary duties of substantive
faimess, but only on a limited class of people. Under state corporate
law, traditional insiders of a corporation, such as officers and directors,
have fiduciary duties to the corporation and to its equity security
holders.i^^

A duty to speak is derived by analogy to the law applicable to
trustees with respect to entrusted property. Under general principals of
fiduciary duty law, a fiduciary may not deal on her own behalf in
property of the beneficiary entrusted to her care.
Non-public
information generated by a corporation can be considered property of
that corporation. Classic insiders can be analogized to trustees who
hold this information as the corpus of a trust for the benefit of the
corporation and its shareholders. Consequently, for the classic insider
to use the information for her own individual purposes would be a
breach of the insider's duty of loyalty under corporate law analogous to
a trustee's embezzlement of a corpus.'^s in Powell's language in
Chiarella:
Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that
corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder s
welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through
fraudulent use of material, non-public information,
Although I know of no case that specifically does so, this reasoning can
also be analogized to the law of "corporate opportunity" which prohibits
an officer or director of a corporation from exploiting a business
opportunity that should belong to the corporation for his own personal
advantage, at least not until he first offers the opportunity to the
corporation.'^^

135 "[i]nsiders... have independent fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its
shareholders." Id. at 655. Once again, this rule requires an additional tweak of the fiduciary duty
traditionally imposed under state corporate law, as the Second Circuit noted in United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2dCir. 1991) (en banc), cert, denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
The insider's fiduciary duties [as applied in federal insider trading cases], it should be
noted, run to a buyer (a shareholder-to-be) and to a seller (a pre-existing shareholder)
of securities, even though the buyer technically does not have a fiduciary relationship
with the insider prior to the trade.
. . • j
Id. at 566 n.2. This is because, as the Supreme Court noted in Chiarella, although the insider
does not technically have a fiduciary duty to the buyer immediately before the sale, the sale itself
creates sueh a duty immediately upon its consummation. Consequently, "it would be a sorry
distinction" to apply a lesser standard to the act that creates the fidueiary relationship. M
136 As we shall see. Justice Ginsburg makes this analogy to embezzlement in her analysis of
outsider trading. See infra text at notes 159-62. My criticism of Ginsburg is that she extends tos
analogy beyond what I believe is the legitimate context of corporate insiders to all confidentiality
agreements and trade secret law.
137 445 U.S. at 230.
138 See infra text at notes 195-97.
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A literal-minded reading of the rule of fiduciary duty would
suggest that it would prohibit only the purchase of equity securities by
insiders on the basis of material non-public information but would not
prohibit the sale.
This is because state law duties run to the
corporation's shareholders, not to the public generally. This simplistic
statement does not, however, account for the practical realities of a
publicly traded corporation in which the shareholders are not a stable
class of identifiable individuals, but a constantly changing pool of
investors who buy shares, hold them for a while, and sell them.
Consequently, for the purposes of insider trading law, one needs to
stretch the class of beneficiaries of the rule from the class of persons
who happen to be shareholders on any specific day, to the pool of actual
and potential future shareholders—i.e., the investment public generally.
To put this another way, the moment an insider sells an equity security,
the buyer who had been a stranger instantaneously becomes a
beneficiary of the insider's fiduciary duty. Intuitively, it would seem
strange to say that the insider has no fiduciary duties with respect to the
transaction that creates the fiduciary relationship.
How does breach of fiduciary duty become fraud? Because a
fiduciary has a duty not to use trust assets for her own benefit, whenever
a person accepts the duties of a fiduciary, she is deemed to make an
implied warranty of fidelity to her beneficiaries. Consequently, it is
reasonable for the beneficiaries to rely on this implied warranty. This
establishes the reliance factor of deception. Because of this justified
reliance, the special facts rule imposes on the fiduciary a duty to
disclose to the beneficiaries any attempt to breach the duty and invade
the corpus.^^^ In other words, when a classic insider trades without first
disclosing material non-public information in her possession she
violates not only her duty of loyalty, but also her duty to speak.
Violation of this duty, thereby, constitutes an "omi[ssion] to state a
material fact necessary ... in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security" in violation of Rule lOb-5. This can be a fraud if the other
elements of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are met.''^''
139 See infra text at notes 160-62.
•40 There are still problematic aspects of interpreting this as "fraud." Specifically, there is the
difficulty of identifying who specifically is defrauded for the purposes of private causes of action.
The insiders' duties to speak run not to any individual shareholder, but to past, present and future
shareholders of the issuer as a class. They are all equally defrauded by the disloyal insider's
silence. The problem is that, under the rule of Blue Chip Stamps, only individuals who actually
purchase and sell securities in reliance on fraud can sue for securities fraud. Consequently, the
shareholders who did not sell (or potential shareholders who did not buy) their shares are not
deemed victims of securities fraud.
Limiting plaintiffs to person who actually trade securities raises its own set of problems.
First, it is not possible, and may not be advisable, to limit plaintiffs to those individuals who
actually purchased shares from, or sold shares to, the insider in the public markets. Under
modem trading practices it is both practically and theoretically impossible to match trades

ENVY AND OUTSIDER TRADING
Once again, this is a stretch. The real wrong underlying this
analysis is that the insider stole property (information) from the
corporation (and its investors), not that he defrauded them. As
Saikrishna Prakash has persuasively argued, if the true gravamen of the
offense were fraud, the insider would be permitted to trade if he first
disclosed his intention to the corporation's board of directors (or if the
hoard or the shareholders grant him the right to trade).Indeed, this is
the rule in the analogous law of "eorporate opportunity"—an insider
may lawfully exploit an opportunity for his own benefit if he first
obtains the permission of the disinterested board members or the
shareholders after making full disclosure.'^2 Moreover, as we shall
see,i'*3 this is the approach that the Supreme Court will take towards
disclosure under the misappropriation theory.
Nevertheless, the courts have not had the courage to follow the
logic of the "special facts" rule to this logical conclusion and have,
instead, required the classic insider to either disclose the non-public
information in his possession—something he is usually prohibited from
doing for other legal reasons—or refrain from trading. This anomaly
would be avoided if, instead, the courts had grounded the insiders' duty

executed over the public markets. Even if we could trace trades, it seems arbitrary to limit
plaintiffs to those individuals who just happened to have traded with the insider, because the
insider defrauded traders generally, not any individual specifically. Alternatively, we could allow
everyone who traded contemporaneously with the insider to form a plaintiff class. This is
consistent with the analysis that the insider defi-auds the public generally. However, it has the
problem that it would lead to unacceptably high damages. For example, assuming arguendo that
Stewart did engage in unlawful insider trading, she avoided approximately $40,000 (or $10 per
share) in losses by trading the day before the announcement of the FDA decision. Let s assume
that other persons purchased an aggregate of 100,000 shares of ImClone stock on the same day
that Stewart traded at a price that was inflated by $10 per share because of lack of disclosure.
Should they be able to sue Stewart for an aggregate of $1 million? And then there is the
unfortunate fact that for every shareholder who was hurt by buying at the inflated price, there was
another shareholder who was helped by selling at the inflated price. That is, under this
hypothetical, because Stewart only sold approximately 4,000 shares on December 27th, other
shareholders sold the other 96,000 shares at the higher price. If Stewart had disclosed her non
public information prior to trading, these shareholders would have lost $10 per share. How is this
prevention of loss to be factored into the damage award? Congress has partially addressed this by
adopting § 20A of the 1934 Act, which gives an express private right of action to any and all
contemporaneous traders but limits the aggregate damages payable to all plaintiffs to the actual
profits made (or losses avoided) by the insider minus any amount previously disgorged to the
SEC. Section 20A does not by its terms preempt private rights of action under § 10(b) so these
questions of liability remain unanswered.
141 Prakash, supra note 87, at 1495-96. Unfortunately, Prakash tries to argue not merely that
this should be recognized as the logical implication of the special facts law, but that it is already
the law. This is incorrect in that there is no case that follows Prakash's analysis in the case of
classic insider trading (i.e., where the source of the information is the issuer of the securities). As
I discuss. Justice Ginsburg does adopt an analysis similar to Prakash's in the context of the
misappropriation theory.
e cm
142 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.05
(1994).
143 See infra text at notes 168-69.
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to disclose within the policy of federal disclosure and anti-fraud
policies, rather than state fiduciary and substantive fairness policies.
2.

Temporary Insiders and Tippees

A more important problem with the traditional interpretation of the
classic theory is that a very literal-minded approach to it would seem
narrowly to limit the class of persons subject to its jurisdiction—i.e.,
corporate officers, directors, controlling shareholders, and perhaps
senior employees. The courts have addressed this by recognizing two
classes of remote traders who can be held liable under the classic
theory: "temporary"i44 (or "constructive")insiders and tippees. The
former are persons who are not classic insiders who nevertheless take
on a fiduciary or similar duty of confidence to the issuer either by
professional status (such as that owed by outside counsel to an issuer or
psychiatrist of a classic insider),'''® by express contract (such as when
an independent contractor signs a confidentiality agreement)
or
perhaps by implied contract established by course of conduct (as when a
classic insider regularly confides and discusses material non-public
information with a family member for the purpose of obtaining business
advice).'''® The latter are persons who, as the terminology suggests, are
tipped off by an insider either because the insider-tipper hopes to
receive a benefit from the tippee in return, or because the tipper wants to
benefit the tippee."^
•'*4 SEC V. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Gal. 1983).
''*5 COFFEE & SELIGMAN, supra note 131, at 1106.
l'® For example, in United States v. Chestman, the Second Circuit, looking to state law for
guidance, found that duties of confidence can be imposed by virtue of status. Examples cited by
the court include "attorney and client, executor and heir, guardian and ward, principal and agent,
trustee and trust beneficiary, and senior coiporate official and shareholder." 947 F.2d 552, 568
(2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert, denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
In order to become a temporary insider having duties of confidentiality, a person must have
a pre-existing relationship with the shareholders of the issuers in which he traded, such as
becoming "their agent... a fiduciary ... [or] a person in whom [they] had placed their trust and
confidence." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980). The Supreme Court has
established m Dirits that mere access to information does not make a person into a temporary
insider:
The basis for recognizing this fiduciaiy duty is not simply that such persons acquired
nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special
confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given
access to information solely for corporate purposes.
463 U.S. at 655 n.l4. Basic principles of authority suggest that such duties can be established by
contract.
l-*® For example, in United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on
other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985), it was shown that a father became a temporary
insider because his son, a classic insider of an issuer, "frequently discussed business affairs" with
him.
"9 According to the Supreme Court in Dirks, "the test is whether the insider personally will
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I have foxmd that students have a hard time telling the differenee
between tippees on the one hand and remote temporary insiders (and
from misappropriators who I discuss in the next section) on the other.
Actually, they are easily distinguished if one keeps in mind that the
former is a reversed mirror-image of the latter. A remote temporary
insider (like a misappropriator) is given information in a relationship of
confidence for the source's own purposes under circumstances that
prohibits the temporary insider from exploiting the information for her
own purposes or from further disclosing the information to others. In
contrast, a tippee is given non-puhlic information with the expectation
that the tippee shall trade on, or otherwise use, the information for her
own purposes. In other words, when a remote temporary insider (or
misappropriator) trades on the information, she is thwarting the will and
violating the property rights of the source of the information. But when
the tippee trades, she is fulfilling the intent of her tipper (albeit in
violation of the tipper's duty to the source).
3.

Under-, and Over-, Inclusiveness

The classic theory is troublesome to proponents of restrictions
against trading on the basis of material non-public information in that it
fails to cover behavior that seems equal in culpability. First, it is not at
all clear that trading even by classic insiders in debt securities of an
issuer is unlawful. This is because, under state law, the duties that an
issuer (and, therefore, its insiders) owes to debt holders are contractual,
rather than fiduciary, in nature,
Standard form debt contracts do not
impose a general duty of disclosure and candor on the issuers of debt.'^^
Consequently, the special circumstances doctrine that makes silence
into a misrepresentation would not seem to apply. It is similarly not
benefit, directly, or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no
breach of duty to stockholders." 463 U.S. at 662. This element is met when the insider receives
"a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings." Id. at 663.
Tippee liability is prophylactic. It is designed to prevent the tipper from doing indirectly through
the tippee what he is prohibited from doing directly (i.e., trading on securities on the hasis of non
public material information received in a relationship of confidence). Id. at 659. Drawing on the
basic principal that mere possession of information does not create duties, the Court rejected the
SEC's proposition that a tippee "inherits" the insider's duties merely by receiving the
information, even if the tippee Imows that the tipper is an insider. Id. at 664. Rather, a tippee can
only become subject to the duties of the disclose or refrain rule if she assumes these duties. This
means that the tippee must know "the information was given to him in breach of a duty by a
person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information." Id. at 661.
UO See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524-25 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
151 See, e.g.. Revised Simplified Model Trust Indenture; Model Note Purchase Agreement,
reprinted in WILLIAM BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS, at A-1, A-35
(5th ed. 2003) (respectively).
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clear whether the managers of limited liability companies would be
subject to insider trading prohibitions because it is not clear whether
their duty to their members is contractual or fiduciary in nature.
Second, the Supreme Court assumed that the classic theory does not
cover the facts of the O'Hagan case when an insider or temporary
insider of a bidder in a tender offer used confidential information
obtained by the bidder to trade on securities of the target. The bidder,
and therefore its insiders, have no fiduciary duties to the target—indeed,
their interests may be hostile.'^2
The critic of classic insider trading law may come to the opposite
normative conclusion from the supporter. If these various cases are
morally equivalent to insider trading, then whatever is intuitively
"wrong" with insider trading cannot be fraud. Consequently, it is
inappropriate for courts to find that even classie insider trading violates
§ 10(b). If Congress believes that certain trading on the basis of certain
categories of material non-public information is "wrong" then it should
enact a statute prohibiting it. This is why the SEC has adopted Rule
14e-3 prohibiting trading on the basis of information received from
bidders not as securities fraud, but as a prophylactic rule to prevent
indirect violations of the substantive requirements applicable to tender
offers.
In contrast with both the traditional proponents of insider trading,
and its traditional opponents, I argue that it is indeed coherent and
appropriate to prohibit classic insider trading but not misappropriation
on the grounds that only the former is consistent with the policy of the
federal securities laws that allocates rights to certain information to the
investment public.
C.

III mill
ill mil
I
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The Misappropriation Theory
1.

Defined

In O'Hagan v. United States^^'^ the Supreme Court adopted the
alternate so-called misappropriation theory of outsider trading. The
difference between the classic theory and the misappropriation theory is
the identity of the original source of the information. Under the classic
theory, the source must be the issuer of the security being traded. Under
the misappropriation theory, it is sufficient that the trader
misappropriates material non-public information in violation of a duty
152 I will challenge these assumption later in this Article and suggest that the securities laws
might imply disclosure obligations in both of these cases. See infra text note 183.
153 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2004).
154 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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of confidence to any source of the information. That is, the source of
the information need not be the issuer of the securities traded and the
trader need have no duty running directly or indirectly back to the
issuer, let alone indirectly to the investment public.i^s
O'Hagan was a partner in a law firm that had represented Grand
Met in connection with a planned hostile tender offer of Pillsbury.
Knowing that the price of a target's shares usually rises upon the
announcement of a tender offer, he bought call options in Pillsbury
before the announcement and reaped a profit of approximately $4.3
million when he exercised his options and sold Pillsbury shares after the
announcement. O'Hagan's actions clearly and unambiguously violated
the prophylactic rules of Rule 14e-3 prohibiting certain trading while in
possession of material non-public information obtained from certain
identified persons in connection with a tender offer. He also violated
his ethical duties as an attorney to his ex-client. Grand Met. However,
he did not engage in classic insider trading under Rule lOb-5 for the
obvious reason that the source of his information was not Pillsbury, the
issuer of the traded securities. Moreover, because he had no previous
relationship to Pillsbury, he owed no duties whatsoever to Pillsbury or
its shareholders.
Although the misappropriation theory maintains the classic
requirements that i) silence cannot constitute fraud unless the silent
party has a duty to speak imposed by a fiduciary or other confidential
relationship, and that ii) the recipient of the information must trade
securities, it jettisons the requirement that the person who is defrauded
and the person (or class of persons) with whom she trades must be one
and the same. That is, under the misappropriation theory, it is not
necessary that the duty of confidence (and related duty to speak) run to
the issuer of the securities (and, thereby, to the shareholders of the
issuer).i56
Consequently, the Court had to adopt an alternate
interpretation as to how the fraud "is in connection with" the purchase
and sale of securities.

155 Wat652:
.
• uThe "misappropriation theory" holds that a person commits fraud in connection with
a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, when he
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a
duty owed to the source of the information
Under this theory, a fiduciary's
undisclosed self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell securities,
in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the
exclusive use of that information.
156 "In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and
purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a
fiduciary-tumed-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential
information." Id.
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In O'Hagan, both the majority and the otherwise vociferous
dissenti" assumed that the defendant had no duty of confidence to the
investment public generally (an assumption I will question later).
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg expressly stated that the misappropriation
theory applies only if there is no such duty.^^s Moreover, they both
accepted the proposition that a person who receives matenal non-public
information in a relationship of confidentiality defrauds his source if he
uses the information for his own use.
.
The reasoning is as follows: whenever one enfrusts non-pubhc
information to a person in a confidential relationship for a specific
purpose, the recipient of that information makes an express or implied
representation and warranty to the source that he will not use that
information for any other purpose. ^59 The Supreme Court had alrea y
held in United States v. Carpenter^^^ that confidential information
constitutes property for the purposes of the federal mail and wire fraud
statute and that the use of the confidential information by the confidant
for any other purpose can constitute a misappropnation of the property
of the source.161 jhe source has the right to rely on the confidant s
contractual representations and warranties of loyalty. Consequently, rt
the recipient is in fact disloyal and intends to use the information for his
own behalf, he has a duty to speak and warn the source that it should
not rely on his loyalty. Accordingly, the use of the information m
violation of the duty of confidence without prior disclosure constitutes
fraud—specifically, it is analogous to embezzlement.
How does it constitute fraud "in connection with the purchase and
sale of securities?"
Justice Ginsburg asserts that O Hagan
"consummated" his fraud
when he used the misappropnated
information to trade in
This aspect of Justice Ginsburg s
opinion generated probably the most vociferous part of Justice Clarence
Thomas's dissent.
turn to the concept of "consummation later.
securities.

I will

157

I59

See id. at 679-701.
not to reveal his employer's confidential informa^n

'became a sham' when the employee provided the inforrnation to his
to obtain trading profits." Id. at 654 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987)).
161 "A coi^pIn/'s^cOTfidential information, we recognized in Carpenter, qualifies as property
to which the company has a right of exclusive use ...." O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654.
"'rSdIlemtnfis satisfied because the fiduciary's fraud is constated, not when fite
fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without dis^sure to his
princiS he uses the information to purchase or sell securities. The secunties
transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide.
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Trade Secrets

The Supreme Court's holdings in Carpenter and O'Hagan that
confidential information constituted property are highly eontroversial
among intellectual property lawyers who have long debated whether
trade secrets should be analyzed as property, contraet, tort or as a sui
generis body of law.^^^ By doing so, the Supreme Court transformed
trade secret law into property law and virtually all eontractual
confidentiality breaehes into fraudulent misappropriation of property.
These interesting issues are beyond the scope of this Article. What
concerns us is that the majority of the Supreme Court found that
O'Hagan's misappropriation of confidential information constituted
fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities within the
meaning of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. This was Justice Thomas's primary
complaint, albeit on somewhat different reasoning from mine. The
problem is that if, as Justice Ginsburg asserts. Grand Met, and not the
public, was the owner of the information as a trade secret, then the
investment publie, by definition, has no property or other right in the
information.
Moreover, under trade secret law the souree of
confidential information, and its confidants, has a right vis-a-vis the
public, to commercially exploit the information to the detriment of the
public. Consequently, for the public to complain that Grand Met (the
source) or O'Hagan (its unfaithful confidant) was using this information
is not jealousy, but envy—^the pain at seeing others enjoying their good
luck—and O'Hagan is wrongfully decided.
3.

Anomalies

There are some obviously troubling anomalies about Ginsburg's
formulation of the misappropriation theory. First, despite the fact that
1^3 See, e.g., Steven Wilf, Trade Secrets, Property, and Social Relations, 34 CONN. L. REV.
787 (2002); Geraldine Szott Mooht, Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development of Intangible
Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 683 (2000); Vincent Chiappetta, Myth,
Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade
Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69 (1999); David D. Friedman, William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61 (1991); Roger G.
Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241
(1998); Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Rucklehaus and Carpenter Signal a
Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1989); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter
and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminilization, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121 (1988). Elsewhere
1 argue that, from an Hegelian perspective, trade secret protection can and should be coherently
analyzed in terms of property. Similarly, in this Article, 1 argue that it is useful to analyze non
public information in the context of insider trading in terms of the allocation of property or semiproperty rights in such information. See Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 84.
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Justice Ginsburg states that such a misappropriation constitutes
securities fraud, strangely enough there are no identifiable victims of a
securities Jfraud who could sue for damages. The source of the
information may be the victim of fraud, but not of securities fraud. This
is because the rule of Blue Chip Stamps^^ established that to be the
victim of securities fraud, the plaintiff must show that it purehased or
sold securities in reliance on the fraud. O'Hagan's souree (Grand Met)
did not do so, however.
This does not mean that absent the
misappropriation theory, O'Hagan would be able to profit from his
despicable behavior to his elient. There are already many state and
federal rules that vindicate the rights of the souree—state trade secret
and, perhaps, fraud law, state professional responsibility law, federal
wire fraud law, and Rule 14e-3 promulgated under the 1934 Act
specifically governing trading during tender offers. Consequently, the
question at bar was not whether O'Hagan violated the law, or whether
his source had legal redress, but whether the investment public was also
harmed.
Under basic principles of Rule lOb-5 jurisprudenee, however, even
contemporaneous traders in the class of securities as the misappropriator
This is because the
are not deemed to be victims of securities fraud.
Court expressly stated that the misappropriator owed no duty to speak to
these traders. Consequently, they cannot claim to have been defi-auded
by his silence.
This anomaly is not of merely theoretical interest because it has
practical implications for the application of the disclose-or-reffain rule.
Indeed, in O'Hagan the Supreme Court took seriously the question of
the substance of diselosure which courts had glossed over in their
application of the classic theory.'^? That is, if the fi-aud consists in the
confidant making an implied misrepresentation of his loyalty to the
source, then the fraud can be avoided if the confidant discloses his
intent to trade. But note, beeause the misappropriator's duty does not
run to the investment public, no disclosure need be made to the
investment public. In Justice Ginsburg's words:
Similarly, full disclosure forecloses liability under the
misappropriation theory: Because the deception essential to the
16'' Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
165 If the trading constitutes unlawful trading, then § 20A of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C. § 78t-l)
gives contemporaneous traders a statutory cause of action to recover the trader s trading profits.
This is not a fraud action as the plaintiff is not entitled to damages for her loss and has no right of
recovery if the SEC has previously sought to recoup these ill-gotten gains. Moreover, as
discussed supra note 140, the language of this section does not define what types of trade violate
the Act.
166 Ginsburg realizes this in that she defines the misappropriation theory as applying only to
persons "who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation's shareholders." United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997). I will challenge this assumption later in this article.
167
text at notes 142-44.
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misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of
information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to
trade on the non-public information, there is no "deceptive device"
and thus no § 10(b) violation

In other words, although Justice Ginsburg claims that;
The misappropriation theory is thus designed to "protect the integrity
of the securities markets against abuses by 'outsiders' to a
corporation who have access to confidential information that will
affect the corporation's security price when revealed, but who owe
no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation's shareholders."^^^
In fact, the misappropriation theory docs no such thing. Under the
theory, misappropriators arc perfectly free to trade on material non
public information to the detriment of the investment public so long as
they do not "deceive" their sources (i.e., so long as they reveal their
intent to trade to their sources).
This follows from the Supreme Court's grounding of the
misappropriation theory in trade secret law. By definition, only the
owner of the trade secret has the right to determine who may know or
use the trade secret.'""'
Furthermore, the logic of O'Hagan implies that there are at least
two other circumstances under which persons can trade on the same
material non-public information without running afoul of § 10(b).
Justice Ginsburg does not discuss the first circumstance. The source
would not violate § 10(b) if it were to trade on behalf of the non-public
information because the information belongs to the source and the
source has no fiduciary duty to the issuer's shareholders. To state this
more strongly, to say that the source owns this information is not merely
to say that the source would not violate the law if it traded on the
information, it is to say that it has the affirmative right to do so. In the
specific facts of O'Hagan, such trading by Grand Met in Pilsbury stock
may have been subject to the substantive and disclosure restrictions
applicable to bidders in tender offers.'"" In other cases, the source
would be under no limitations.
An example of permissible trading by a source is suggested by the
facts of Carpenter v. United StatesH^ The defendant, R. Foster Winans
was an employee of The Wall Street Journal who was one of the writers
of the periodic Heard on the Street column that reports on market trends
and rumors. Knowing that the market tended to react to information
168 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 655.
169 Id. at 653.
190 See infra text at notes 182-85.
191 Once again, the tender offer rules impose both disclosure duties and substantive standards
on the bidders in tender offers. Certain trading in target securities by a potential bidder may or
not violate these rules.
172 484 U.S. 19(1987).
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published in this column, Winans and his co-conspirators would,
immediately before publication, trade on securities of issuers to be
mentioned in the columns. The Supreme Court found that the content
and timing of The Wall Street Journal's articles were confidential
business information belonging to The Wall Street Journal, and,
therefore, property.^" Because Winans had a duty of confidence to the
newspaper pursuant to his employment agreement, by breaching this
confidence, he had stolen property by fraud in violation of the federal
mail fraud statute.Although the Supreme Court split on whether this
also constituted unlawful trading under § 10(b), the reasoning anticipates
its eventual adoption of the misappropriation theory in O'Hagan. Note,
however, that in this case, although it might be a violation of
joumalistic ethics. The Wall Street Journal could have traded on the
basis of the information in question without violating any federal law.'"
Justice Ginsburg does recognize the second anomalous
circumstance of lawful trading: the source could give the confidant
permission to trade.
[T]he textual requirement of deception precludes § 10(b) hability
when a person trading on the basis of nonpublic information has
disclosed his trading plans to, or obtained authorization from, the
principal—even though such conduct may affect the securities
markets in the same manner as the conduct reached by the
misappropriation theory.'"'^
Why a source might do so can be illustrated by looking at the facts
of O'Hagan. O'Hagan was a partner in a law firm that represented
Grand Met in a planned hostile tender offer for the stock of Pillsbury.
O'Hagan used this information in violation of his attorney's duty of
confidence to purchase call options on Pillsbury s stock making a profit
of $4.3 million.'" Lawyers are expensive and frequently negotiate
premium fees over and above their hourly rate for complex transactions.
Grand Met could, theoretically, have offered that, rather than paying a
premium fee in cash, it would grant the firm the right to use the
confidential information to trade in target securities. In this instant case,
as Justice Ginsburg notes,'" such an arrangement might violate the
173 See id at 23-26.
174 Seeid.aill.
.
.. .
175 In Carpenter, "[t]he conspirators agreed that the scheme would not affect the joumalishc
purity of the 'Heard' column, and the district Court did not fmd that the contents of any of fte
articles were altered to further the profit potential of petitioners' stock-trading scheme. Id at 23.
Accordingly there were no facts to support an allegation that Winans was engaged in unlawful
manipulation under § 9(e) of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C. § 78i(e)). It seems likely to me, however,
that the real concern of the DOJ in bringing the case was not so much msider trading, but the
potential for manipulation.
176 See 521 U.S. at 659 n.9 (emphasis added).
177 See id. at 648.
178 See id. at 657 n.8.
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substantive and prophylactic provisions governing tender offers. But,
according to Justice Ginsburg it would not constitute securities fraud
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
When Justice Thomas confronted Justice Ginsburg with this
second anomaly (that confidants may freely trade with their source's
permission),!™ Justice Ginsburg suggested half-heartedly—and tucked
away in a footnote—that this is merely an unfortunate example of an
under-inclusive law. "[T]he fact that § 10(b) is only a partial antidote to
the problems it was designed to alleviate does not call into question its
prohibition of conduct that falls within its textual proscription."!8o
This supposed defense, in fact, contradicts the entire basis of the
misappropriation theory as articulated by Justice Ginsburg a,nd
implicitly reveals its intellectual bankruptcy. According to Justice
Ginsburg, the confidant's use of non-public information constitutes a
misappropriation and, therefore, a fraud, because the source is the
owner of the non-public information. Justice Ginsburg has also
expressly recognized that O'Hagan owed no duty to the issuer or its
shareholders,!^! implying that they have no property interest in the
information. If, however, the source has a valid property interest in the
information, then it should be entitled to use it however it sees fit.
Indeed, trade secrets are nothing but a monopolistic power of the source
to economically exploit its information for its own purposes, and to
keep the information out of the hands of the public.
Consequently, the source should be entitled to buy securities of
other issuers on the basis of the information. Moreover, the source
should be able to transfer "its" property to whomever it wants and grant
others the right to trade on this information. !^2
If, however, as Justice Ginsburg suggests, in an ideal world the
source would not be permitted to give others the permission to trade on
the basis of the information, then she is suggesting that the source does
not have a valid property interest in the information as a trade secret.
But, if the source does not have a valid property interest in the
179 See id. at 689-90.
180 Id. at 659 n.9.
181
text at notes 157-58.
182 I must once again emphasize that the Supreme Court's choice of O'Hagan to announce the
misappropriation theory confuses the analysis because O'Hagan involves a tender offer. The
substantive mles governing tender offers under Rule 14e-3 clearly limit the right of Grand Met
and its disloyal confidant, O'Hagan, to freely trade on confidential information concerning the
proposed tender offer. In my analysis, O'Hagan should not be considered a misappropriation
case because it is consistent with the policy underlying the classie theory. That is. Congress and
the SEC have allocated rights in information conceming tender offers to the investment public.
Consequently, public resentment against O'Hagan's use of this information refleets jealousy, not
envy. Unfortunately, as I discuss throughout this Article, the fact that, under current statutory
analysis, insider trading must be shoe-homed into the category of traditional fraud prevents a
court from reaching this result. A consistent insider trading law would, therefore, probably
require an amendment to the federal securities laws.
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information, then the confidant should be able to use the information
without violating the source's rights or committing fraud. That is, the
proposition that the confidant is committing securities fraud is parasitic
on the proposition that it is not fraudulent for the source to trade on the
information. Consequently, in order to find that trading on the basis of
this type of non-public information constitutes securities fraud, it should
first be necessary to find that the public, rather than the source, has
rights in this information.

LY.

SECURITIES LAW

AND TRADE SECRET POLICY

As discussed, the classic theory of insider trading holds that it is
unlawful for traditional insiders of an issuer (i.e., officers, directors,
employers, and other persons having a confidential relationship with the
issuer) to trade in the equity securities of that issuer on the basis of
material non-publie information obtained from that issuer.
The
misappropriation theory of outsider trading holds that in some cases it is
unlawful to trade in securities on the basis of material non-public
information obtained in a relationship of confidence to the source of the
information who need not be the issuer of the securities traded.
Although many proponents of the classic theory intuitively find the
classic theory to be underinclusive in regulating objectionable behavior,
others intuit that the misappropriation theory risks being objectionably
overinclusive.
In this section, 1 argue that by combining an analysis of material
non-public information in terms of property (or quasi-property) with a
consideration of the disclosure regime established by Congress in the
federal securities laws, one can bring some order into the seemingly
chaotic law of insider trading. I argue that application of the distinction
between envy and jealousy shows that the classic theory is, in fact, the
correct analysis of insider trading as a violation of securities law policy
and the misappropriation theory is an inappropriate extension of the
doctrine of fraud. Classie theory addresses the righteous jealous fear of
shareholders that rivals—classic insiders—will take away something
that belongs to the shareholders—information that belongs to the issuer.
The misappropriation theory, however, reflects the envy of the
investment public of the good fortune of other traders who have
informational advantages. Moreover, this judgment is implicit in
Justice Ginsburg's internally contradictory language. Congress might
decide to change the status quo and reallocate property rights in a
broader category of non-publie information to investors. There might
also be other good reasons for Congress to adopt broad, prophylactic
rules governing non-fraudulent trading on the basis of material non-
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public information. The misappropriation theory as articulated to date,
however, represents judicial over-extension of the law of securities
fraud.
A.

Classic Theory: Information About the Issuer Belongs to the
Public

As discussed, the classic theory of insider trading treats non-public
information obtained from an issuer as property belonging indirectly to
the shareholders of the issuer. Many academics who question the
wisdom of an across-the-board prohibition of classic insider trading
agree that non-public information should be analyzed as property, but
challenge the assumption that this information belongs to the issuer's
shareholders. This argument is based on the technical proposition that,
under state law, shareholders are not recognized as the legal title holders
of corporate property, but ignores the fact that the law often recognized
beneficial and other equitable interests in property. Under basic
principles of corporate law, the corporation and its shareholders are
separate legal persons. Property owned by the corporation belongs to
the corporation, and not its shareholders, even though the corporate
officers and directors have a fiduciary duty to manage the corporation,
and therefore, its property, for the benefit of the shareholder. This
means that under coiporate law, non-public information does not belong
to the shareholders.'" Critics argue from this that an issuer should be
able to allocate its "property" in non-public information through private
contracting in whatever way it deems fit so long as it follows its duties
to its shareholders.
This argument is most closely identified with Henry Manne, one of
the earliest and probably the most vociferous and consistent critic of
rules against insider trading.He specifically argues that, just as
issuers may use other corporate assets to remunerate management,
issuers should be able to grant corporate insiders the right to trade on

183 See, e.g., Manne, supra note 89; Macey, supra note 89; see also Larry E. Ribstein,
Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123 (1998); Kimberly D. Krawiec,
Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the
Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443 (2001); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parehomovsky, On
Insider Trading, Markets, and "Negative" Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229
(2001); Steven M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between
Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589 (1999); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981
SUP. CT. REV. 309.
184 Manne published his seminal book Insider Trading and the Stock Market back in 1966. He
has continued his losing battle for the legalization of insider trading to this day. See, e.g., Henry
G. Maime, The Case for Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2003, at A14.
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inside information as part of their compensation package.From this
perspective, concerns about abusive insider trading are, in fact, no
different than concerns about any other form of excessive executive
compensation and conflicts of interest between management and
shareholders. He believes that many of the traditional concems
expressed by the proponents of restrictions on insider trading can be
addressed through full disclosure and, perhaps, prior approval by
disinterested directors or the shareholders.'^^ Indeed, this is the usual
approach of the securities laws. Concems about faimess should be left
to state corporate law.
For example, in order to keep such
compensation plans within the protections of the business judgment
mle, management should have them approved by a majority of
disinterested directors (if any) or the public shareholders, after full
disclosure.
It is often said that insider trading law is necessary because
investors would flee the market if they thought the scales were tipped.'^^
However, as Manne argues, no one has ever tested this empirical
assumption.
One way to do so would be to allow corporate insiders
to trade on non-public information so long as they disclosed their intent
publicly and obtained consent from the issuer's board and/or
shareholders.'^^ If investors find such behavior objectionable, this
should be reflected in the issuer's stock prices. If stock prices were
'85 See Manne, supra note 89, at 565, 578-79, 582-83. In Frank Easterbrook's words:
[IJnsider trading should be permitted to the extent the firm that created the information
desires (or tolerates) such trading. The firm extracts value through exploiting the
knowledge itself or reducing the salary of those who exploit it. The firm's decision to
allow insiders to profit through a given device is the same in principle as any ordinary
compensation decision, or as any decision to license know-how in exchange for a
payment. If the managers err in setting their compensation, redress lies in the market,
which will reduce their future earnings.
Easterbrook, supra note 183, at 331.
186 Manne, supra note 89, at 581.
'87 por example, Ginsburg partially defends her decision in O'Hagan on these policy grounds:
The theory is also well-tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure
honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence.. . . Although
informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely would
hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated
nonpublic information is unchecked by law. An investor's information disadvantage
vis-a-vis a misappropriator with material, non-public information stems from
contrivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or
skill.
521 U.S. at 658-59 (citations omitted). This concept of preventing informational advantages that
carmot be overcome is most closely associated with Victor Brudney's argument in his seminal
article Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws.
See Brudney, supra note 88.
188 See Manne, supra note 89, at 555-57.
189 This would parallel the rule aimoimced in O'Hagan that one can avoid liability as a
misappropriator if one discloses one's intentions to trade to the source of the information. See
supra text at notes 169-72. As discussed, Prakash has argued that this rule of permitted candid
trading is already implicit under the classic theory. See supra note 141.
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negatively affected, one would expect corporations to react by imposing
restrictions on trading. Alternately, if prices are not negatively affected,
this would be strong evidence that investors do not care about such
behavior.
B.

The Classic Theory as a Corollary of Mandatory Disclosure

Needless to say, critics attack both the substantive and moral
assumptions underlying Manne's arguments. I will not engage in this
specific debate here because I believe it is beyond the limited point of
this Article. This debate relates to the question of what an ideal federal
securities policy might be if we were starting from scratch from a state
of nature before property rights in information have been allocated. I
am interested, however, in analyzing the issue in the context of the
given federal securities law regime and current securities practice.
I agree with Manne that the insider trading law is profitably
analyzed as an issue of the allocation of beneficial interests in
information conceived as a valuable asset, regardless of the location of
legal title. However, I argue that the policy as to how beneficial
interests should be allocated has already been decided by Congress. It
is, therefore, not currently subject to reallocation either by regulation by
the SEC, adjudication by the federal courts, or contract between issuers
and their insiders.
Manne scoffs at the claims of supporters of insider trading
regulation that certain information is the property of shareholders.'^®
He is technically correct that under corporate law, legal title to
corporate information resides in the corporate entity, and only indirectly
to the shareholders who are separate legal persons. But the very
example he uses to demonstrate that insider trading law is an aberration
within American law,'®' in fact, illustrates the ambiguity of the concept
of ownership in corporate law.
In SEC V. Texas Gulf Sulphur CoJ'^'^ the Second Circuit found that
classic insider trading by officers and directors violated Rule lOb-5,
albeit on the now discredited fairness justification. In that case, the
issuer, a mining company, learned that initial tests indicated that certain
land contained a potentially rich mineral strike. Classic insiders
purchased securities of the issuer before this information was made
public. Manne proclaims:

'9® See Manne, supra note 89, at 549-50.
191 Boyle has called this an enigmatic "island of egalitarianism" in an otherwise individualistic
ocean. See infra text at note 204.
192 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert, denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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So notice the irony: TGS officials buying stock with knowledge of a
new ore vein have somehow done something immoral, but the
company itself buying surrounding land, utilizing precisely the same
information, has merely performed in a business-like fashion.
In other words, far from mandating parity of information, the usual rule
of American law is the protection of informational advantages.
This argument is supposed to support his contention that the
argument that insider information belongs to shareholders is empty,
"not worthy of serious attention" and fallacious.'^'' To a corporate
lawyer, however, this analogy is so inapt that it comes close to being
facetious. Marme's argument invokes the relative ownership rights in
information of a corporation and a stranger. It does not address the
issue involved in insider trading—the relative property rights in
information among an issuer of registered securities, its insiders, and
the issuer's investors, to whom the issuer and its insiders owe fiduciary
duties. Manne is suggesting that state real property and general fraud
law would permit the issuer to buy neighboring land from a stranger
without first disclosing its non-public information to the stranger. Even
if this is true, Manne is ignoring the fact that it would almost certainly
have been a violation of fiduciary duty under corporate law for an
insider of the issuer to purchase this land for her own benefit. The land
would be deemed a "corporate opportunity" that belonged directly to
the corporation for the indirect benefit of its shareholders.
Consequently, such a purchase by an insider would be a breach of the
insider's duty of loyalty. This is the more appropriate analogy to insider
trading.
Manne's stronger argument is to analogize from the law of
corporate opportunity to suggest a more appropriate rule for insider
trading. An insider is permitted to take a corporate opportunity if he
first offers it to the corporation and, after full disclosure, the corporation
declines to take it. That is, the modem mle of corporate opportunity is
not a complete ban, but is a matter of private contract between the board
of directors and the opportunist coupled with a duty of full disclosure
that does not apply to contracts among strangers.One might be able
to argue that, by analogy, insiders should be able to exploit non-public
information belonging to the issuer if they obtain prior approval of the

193 Manne,
note 89, at 550-51.
194 Id. at 550.
195 The definition of "corporate opportunity" differs from state to state and case to case.
However, the Texas Gulf Sulfur facts would seem to fall within all of the traditional interest or
expectancy, line of business, and fairness tests. JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIGNS
LAW AND POLICY, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 788-91 (5th ed. 2003).
196 As discussed, Prakash goes so far as to suggest not merely that this should be the rule, but
that it is currently the rule. See supra note 141. This is empirically incorrect. No court has so
held.
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disinterested members of the board or the shareholders after foil
disclosure of their intent to do so. Even if one accepts this analogy, it is
not clear what the appropriate parallel law of insider trading would be.
A board may not grant blanket approval to insiders to take foture
corporate opportunities but must consider each opportunity on a caseby-case basis. Does this imply that an insider should seek board
approval each and every time she wishes to trade on insider
'"^""Mame'also argues that property rights, generally, and o^ership
of information, specifically, are a matter of positive law and can be
allocated however society deems fit.
In the absence of statutoiy
allocation, this is left to the private ordenng of contract.
This may be
true as a general rule of American law, but m arguing that it is true ot
classic insider information, Manne is, however, suppressing an
important point he makes later in his argument.
. ,
i
As he admits, his critique "calls into doubt not simp y the rule
about insider trading, but the entire 'philosophy of full disclosure.
This is precisely correct: the classic theory of insider trading is
inextricably linked to the existing mandatory disclosure regime. The
one is the corollary of the other. Consequently, Manne may be correct
that absent a statutory allocation of property rights m information, such
allocation would be left to the private ordering of contract However,
Manne is wrong to suggest that Congress has not in fact already
allocated a limited beneficial interest to the public m one class ot
information.'^^
^
It is my thesis that the mandatory disclosure regime of the federal
securities laws should be analyzed as an implicit Congressiona
allocation of an indirect or beneficial interest in information generated
by and obtained from the issuers of registered secunties to persons who
trade in these securities. That is, a public corporation must either
disclose the information to the public (i.e., give actual possession of the
information to the investment public generally) or use it for corporate
purposes (i.e., recognize its shareholders' right to enjoy the information
indirectly through their investment m the corporation). Consequently,
is consistent with this policy that those who have special access to this
information should not have incentives to keep the information non
public by allowing them to use it for themselves. That is, some form of

197 See id.

disclosed or completely exploited by other traders.

Id. at 562).
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classic insider trading prohibition is the corollary of a mandatory
disclosure regime.^"''
As Manne understands, if one really believed, on efficiency or
other grounds, that issuers should be able to adopt policies allowing
classic insiders to trade on the basis of material non-public information,
then, to be consistent, one should have the eourage of one's convictions
and also argue for a major revision, if not a complete abandonment, of
the mandatory disclosure regime of the 1934 Act. Of course, many
legal economists do challenge the wisdom or efficiency of the
mandatory disclosure regime.^*^' It is highly unlikely that Congress is
about to radically amend the federal securities laws to eliminate or
severely undermine this regime at this time.^o^
James Boyle has suggested that insider trading is a "puzzle"203
because it is "a statutory island of egalitarianism at the very heart of
capitalism."204
fact, the better metaphor would be that classic insider
trading should be seen as only a prominent peninsula of a much larger
egalitarian continent called mandatory disclosure.
C.

S'tii

Return to the Misappropriation Theory

As discussed above,^''^ the majority of the Supreme Court in the
O'Hagan opinion grounded its opinion on an analysis of trade secrets as
a form of intellectual property belonging to the source of the
information. The problem is that trade seeret law's treatment of non
public information is diametrically opposed to the federal securities
laws' treatment of such information. In the previous section I argued
that the federal securities acts in effect allocate beneficial rights in
material non-public information generated by an issuer to the
investment public generally (i.e., its existing and potential future
shareholders). In contrast, trade seeret law gives the generator of other
types of non-public information the exclusive right to exploit this
information for its own advantage so long as it keeps the information
secret. Federal securities law generally, and insider trading law
200 Manne claims that proponents of insider trading rules naively "assume that a rule against
insider trading is the equivalent of a full and timely disclosme rule perfectly enforced. Id. at
552. I am not making the assumption that forbidding insider trading would encourage disclosure.
Rather, I am suggesting that it is a corollary to mandatory disclosure rules because it removes one
incentive to violate these rules.
201 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fisehel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984).
202 Indeed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in the wake of the scandals of 2001, reflects a
strengthening, not a dilution, of this regime.
203 Boyle, supra note 87.
204 Id. at 1491.
205
text at notes 154-62.
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specifically, is designed to minimize the informational advantages of a
certain class of persons vis-a-vis the public by granting rights in
information to the public. It is egalitarian in spirit. In contrast, trade
secret law is designed to maximize informational advantages of a
certain class of persons vis-a-vis the public. It is individualistic, indeed
monopolistic, in spirit. Consequently, any attempt to base an extension
of insider liability based on trade secret law is doomed to contradiction.
To do so conflates jealousy—the appropriate protection of one's
rights—^with envy—the inappropriate desire to deprive another of her
rights.
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as follows:
"Trade Secret" means information, including a formula, pattem,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that: (i)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.^''^
The Restatement of Torts states that a "trade secret is any information
that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and
that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential
economic advantage over others."20'' The differences between these two
definitions are beyond the scope of this Article.^"^
What both
definitions have in common is that trade secrets are non-public
information that gives the source economically valuable information
advantages over the public generally. Many commentators disagree
with the Supreme Court's blanket assertion that trade secrets are a form
of property rather than "a collection of other legal norms—contract,
fraud and the like—^united only by the fact that they are used to protect
secret information."209 Nevertheless, in any case a trade secret is a right
of the claimant to exploit secret information and to prevent certain
misappropriation of the secret by others.
Since at least Friedman, Landes, and Posner's classic article Some
Economics of Trade Secret Law,^^^ the predominant justification of
trade secret law is that our society gives a limited monopolistic right to
the source to exploit trade secrets as an incentive to create this

206 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 537-51 (1980 & Supp. 1986).
207 RESTATEMENT 3D OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
208 For a discussion of the differences, see generally Chiappetta, supra note 163, at 76-81.
209 The basis of trade secret law is so unclear that one analyst states bluntly that "there is no
such thing as a normatively autonomous body of trade secret law." Bone, supra note 163, at 245.
Bone wishes to limit trade secret proteetion to rights "created by express contract or justified as
contraet default rules." Id. at 246.
210 See supra note 163.
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information.211 in order to make it financially attractive for the source
to invest resources to create this information we give the source a
monopoly vis-a-vis the public to exploit this information commercially.
The other competing, or complementary, rationale for trade secret law is
business ethics—^that is, to prevent certain "bad acts" in the sense of
independent wrongs (i.e., such as theft, fraud and breach of d^uty).^'^
What both of these justifications have in common is the recognition that
the source has the exclusive rights to commercially exploit secret
information. The economic benefits of such exclusive rights can serve
as the incentive desired under the first theory. Moreover, by definition
the appropriation of control over the information could not constitute a
"bad act" under the second justification unless one first presupposes that
the source has valid and exclusive rights in the information that could
be mwappropriated.
.
,1
Elsewhere I argue that from both a Hegelian jurisprudential
perspective and as a practical matter, it is both coherent and analytically
helpful to analyze exelusive trade secret rights as a limited form of
property .213 For the limited purposes of this Article, we do not need to
reach the question of proper categorization. Whether we consider a
trade secret right as property, contract, tort, or a sui generis combination
of rights, it is a right of the source to keep the information secret from
the public, and the right to exploit that secrecy. It is a form of
monopolistic informational advantage. The public by definition has no
right to the information—in fact, a trade seeret is nothing but the right
to keep the information away from the public to the public s economic
disadvantage.
j•
This is why Justice Ginsburg's analysis of outsider trading in
O'Hagan is so unsatisfactory. Her entire misappropriation theory is
211 "Our analysis of trade secret law is congruent with the basic economic explanation for
patent protection—that it provides a means of intemalizing the benefits of innovation.
Friedman, Landes & Posner, supra note 163, at 64. Bone divides the efficiency rationale into two
forms. "The first argues that trade secret law enhances incentives to create. The second argues
that it reduces the level of private investment in discovering and protecting secrets ^ well as the
transaction costs associated with value-enhancing transfers." Bone, supra note 163, at 262. 1
discuss the efficiency rationale elsewhere, see Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 84, and
shall not raise it further at this juncture.
.
u
u
212 Consequently, there are "two separate categories of trade secret misappropriation: breach
of duty and bad acts." Chiappetta, supra note 163, at 73. For example, the Uniform Trade Secret
Act, which has been adopted in over forty states, defines misappropnation of trade secrets either
as "(1) disclosure or use without consent when under a duty to maintain secrecy or hmit use, or
(2) an acquisition by improper means. 'Improper means' include 'theft, bnbery,
misrepresentation, breach [of duty] or inducement of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy or
espionage through electronic or other means.'" Id. at 78 (quoting UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§
Un l(2)(ii)(A)). In other words, the Uniform Trade Secret Act makes a clear distinction
between mere breach of confidentiality and fraud—precisely the distinction the Supreme Court
failed to perceive in Carpenter and O'Hagan when it found that mere misappropnation of
confidential information constitutes fraud.
213 Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 84.
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based on an analysis that the misappropriated information is a tode
secret that belongs to the source. By definition, a trade secret doeyot
belong to the public—under the basic logic of trade secret law i
information belonged to, or became known by, the public, it
be a trade secret. Justice Ginsburg recognizes this when she stated tha
the misappropriation theory only applies when the trader has no duty to
S: ZeZIt public. To say .ha. te disloyal conf.da...-s use o tas
source's information was wrongful v/s-u-v« .he somce .s^Xse
source had a valid trade secret m the information. Putting these
together, the public, by definition, has no entitlement to the information
and the use of the information does not, therefore, interfere with any
rights of the investment public. Use of this information cannot,
therefore, be securities fraud.
,
Justice Ginsburg implicitly realizes this contradiction when she
opines that the fact that, under her theory, the confidant would not
engaging in securities fraud if he first obtained the consent of the source
to trade as an unfortunate underinclusiveness of the statutory scheme^
This is also equivalent to saying that, in an ideal world. Congress wou d
have allocated the property rights in the source s material no^-Pubh^
information to the public. This means that the
allocated to the public, not the source. This is i^c^sistent with he
grounding of the misappropriation theory m the infongement of the
source's property rights in its information. That is, the first leg of the
misappropriation theory (fraud on the source) depends on the judgment
that the source's property rights in the information are leghim^'
the second leg (securities fraud) depends on the judgment that the
source's property rights are illegitimate and that the property righ s in
the information should be allocated to the public.
/^ - u
Consequently, one can not consistently argue, as Justice Ginsburg
does, that a misappropriator has stolen trade secrets from the source anJ
that ideally the source would not have the right to grant the right
others to use the property.
Hictinmikh
A coherent insider/outsider trading policy would distinguish
between information that "belongs" to the public and info^tion
belonging to the source. If the information belongs to the public, the
no one but the public—not even the source—should be able to trade on
the information without first making disclosure. If the info'^^tion
belongs to someone else, then the owner of the information should be
able to exploit the information in whatever way it deems appropriate,
including by securities trading.
If a misappropriator trades on
information, it should be deemed securities fraud only if the information
belongs to the investment public. If, however, the information belongs
to some other party, the law of trade secrets should app y.
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A Brief Aside on Martha Stewart

The SEC's civil insider trading action against Stewart is based on a
novel application of the misappropriation theory that would extend it
even beyond Justice Ginsburg's stated justification. Presumably the
government first began investigating Stewart's trading in ImClone stock
because she was a friend of Sam Waksal, ImClone's former chairman,
who had admittedly engaged in illegal trading of ImClone stock in
advance of the public announcement of bad news. Obviously, this
raised the suspicion that Waksal had spoken to Stewart. If he had,
Waksal would have been a classic tipper and Stewart might have been a
tippee of a classic insider. Investigation, however, showed that this was

: !!!!»•

not the case.
t r^i
The only communication Stewart had with respect to ImClone
stock on the date of her trade was indirectly with her broker Peter
Bacanovic through his assistant Daniel Faneuil. At the trial, Faneuil
testified that he told Stewart that Waksal was trying to sell his stock.
Assuming the SEC's argument will follow allegations made m the
DOJ's indictment, it will allege that Bacanovic was a misapproprmtor
because he violated Merrill Lynch's policy that forbids its brokers from
piggy-backing on the investment strategy of its clients. That is, a
Merrill Lynch broker is not supposed to tell his customers what his
other customers are doing. If Stewart understood that Bacanovic was
violating his duty then she might be a tippee of a misappropriator.
I would argue that, in fact, Bacanovic would not be a
misappropriator under the rule of O'Hagan. In order to misappropnate
information it is not enough that the defendant violate a fiduciary tj^e
duty of confidentiality, as Bacanovic might have done. The infomation
disclosed must be the property of the person to whom the duty ot
confidentiality runs, otherwise the disclosure is not a misappropnation,
merely a breach of contract. The SEC would have to, therefore,
maintain that Merrill Lynch was the proprietor of the fact that Waksal
was trying to dump his stock.
. . ^
j
Unlike the misappropriated information m Carpenter and U Hagm
Merrill Lynch did not generate this information itself, nor was it the
source. More importantly, as we have seen^i^ to be a trade secret by
definition the claimant must derive actual or potential economic value
from the fact that the information is not generally known. As I have
discussed, this means that the claimant has the right to exploit the secret
for its own economic benefit. To argue that the fact of Waksal s trading
was the property of Merrill Lynch, therefore, the SEC would have to, in
effect, argue that Merrill Lynch was entitled to exploit this

214 &e5«pra text at notes 207-12.
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information—^presumably by trading on this information on its own
accoxmt!
E.

Trade Secret v. Securities Law Policies

Justice Ginsburg's intuition in O'Hagan that there is something
anomalous in letting the source trade in information, does, however,
raise a very different and valid concern—should our society grant trade
secret protection to sources for the type of information involved in the
misappropriation cases, or should society adopt a positive law granting
the public generally a property right in this information (as it enjoys in
information generated by issuers)? This question requires a balancing
of the competing policies of federal securities law and state trade secret
law.
Indeed, one criticism of Carpenter and O 'Hagan from trade secret
specialists is that the Supreme Court is overly solicitous towards the
claimed property interests of the sources of information. The Court has
assumed that the states have unequivocally granted property rights in
certain information when the state law precedents are far more
ambiguous. Arguably, Carpenter should better have been analyzed as a
garden-variety breach of contract suit that did not invoke property, let
alone fraud, at all. As others have asked before me, do we really want
to reinterpret federal fraud law so broadly that we are criminalizing
simple breaches of contract?^*^
The trade secret misappropriated by Winans in the Carpenter case
was The Wall Street Journal's publication schedule.^i^ As discussed,
the standard justification of trade secret law is that it incentivizes the
creation of information through the grant of informational monopolies.
It is intended to prevent potential competitors from using the
information. Presumably, a newspaper needs a publication schedule as
a practical matter and does not need further incentives to create one.
Moreover, Winans and his conspirators were not attempting to compete
with The Wall Street Journal—ihey did not intend to publish a rival
newspaper and did not seek to sell the information to The New York
Times, Forbes, or any other competitor. Consequently, when The Wall
Street Journal exposed Winans' misdeeds on its front page and fired
him, it was not because it was worried about competition. Presumably,
it was concerned with its journalistic reputation—^who would trust a
newspaper that held itself out as a neutral reporter of business news if it
was known that its writers were trading on their articles? This may be

215 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
216 See rapra text at note 173.
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an important ethical value, but it has nothing to do with the federal
securities laws.
Similarly, there may be very good reasons why stock brokers
should not reveal one customer's trading strategy to another customer or
otherwise piggy-back on that knowledge. This is presumably why
Merrill Lynch prohibited its employees from doing so and Merrill
Lynch was justified for firing Bacanovic and Fanuil for violating the
terms of their employment. These reasons might relate to the SEC s
substantive regulation of registered broker-dealers under the 1934 Act.
It is not clear, however, that these reasons invoke the anti-fraud
concerns of Rule lOb-5.
F.
i

Gaps and Anomalies Under the Current Statute

Under my analysis, a coherent insider trading law would be
grounded on the statutory disclosure duties of the securities law
I |i'
conceptualized as an allocation of certain non-public information from
L::
the person having a disclosure duty to the investment public generally.
^
It is a short-cut that allows us to avoid the circuitous route followed by
5!
the traditional special circumstances rule. That is, rather than relying on
',!'
a multi-step process by which federal law would incorporate state law
:'
that imposes duties on an insider to a corporation, and on the
^
corporation to its shareholders, and then expanding this to a duly of the
corporation and its insiders to all potential sha,reholders (i.e., the
investment public), my approach would recognize a federal duty
imposed directly on the insiders of reporting companies and running
directly to the investment public. That is, the insiders' duty not to trade
I......
would be reconceptualized as a duty related to the issuer s disclosure
'j;i»
obligations. This analysis would probably leave the theories of
' t e m p o r a r yinsidersa n dtippeeslargelyintact.
Standing alone, however, this analysis may be coirect as a matter
of policy, but is probably insufficient as a matter of judicial jurisdiction
and statutory interpretation. The eatchall provision of Rule lOb-5 is
limited to fraud, and the concept of fraudulent silence is dependent on a
duty to speak. I have argued that as a matter of policy, an implied duty
to speak for insiders is consistent with mandatory disclosure by issuers
and others. Unfortunately, the statute does not contain an express duty
to speak. Moreover the absence of an express duty to speak, by
negative pregnant, should probably be read to imply that there is no
such implied duty.
The federal securities laws do not currently mandate continuous
disclosure. Rather, the statute expressly requires disclosures at specific
times, such as at the end of the fiscal year and each fiscal quarter, and

I

E
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when parties take certain actions, such as making a public offering of
securities, soliciting proxies, and making tender offers.
The
jurisprudence as to when parties have an implied duty to speak in the
gap periods between these statutory disclosures is complex and
confusing. A federal judge might justifiably be reluctant to adopt my
theory and continue to rely on state law as the source of duties.
Consequently, a coherent insider trading law would probably
require that Congress amend the 1934 Act. Ideally, Congress would
specify when trading on the basis of material non-public information is
unlawful. Alternately, Congress could change the language of § 10(b)
to make it more like the language of § 14e-3 authorizing the SEC not
merely to define fraud (as it does now), but also promulgate
prophylactic rules governing trading on the basis of non-public
information.
CONCLUSION

Insider trading law should recognize the righteous jealousy of the
investment public when insiders try to enjoy the public's information
for their own benefit, but should not encourage the public's envy when
others enjoy information that the law recognizes is rightfiilly theirs.
Consequently, a coherent and ethical law of insider trading should begin
with a consideration of the allocation of property rights in information.
The misappropriation theory is both unethical and incoherent precisely
because it tries to graft insider trading law upon trade secret law. The
federal securities laws reflect a fundamental egalitarian moment in that
they allocate certain types of material insider information to the public.
Trade secret law, in contrast, is radically individualistic and libertarian
in nature in that it grants exclusive monopolistic rights in non-public
information.
If Congress believes that trading on this type of
information is somehow wrong, it needs to amend the law to supersede
state trade secret law and re-allocate property rights in the information
from the source to the public. This would not merely result in a law of
insider trading that is consistent with the federal securities law policy, it
would also remedy the current embarrassment that insider and outsider
trading are de facto common law crimes.

